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ABSTRACT     
This thesis aims at examining the validity of free speech claims for religious exemptions on the one hand 
and reviewing the Masterpiece Court's holdings on the current complex entanglement of religious 
exemption theories, on the other hand; and finally, it also provides a possible suggestion for co-existing 
between two constitutional values without an all-or-nothing solution.   
As to the free speech argument, the Court would likely decide that a compelled speech argument should 
succeed if, and only if, the vendor’s good or service is expressive under the Free Speech Clause. For a 
baker, the Court would protect making a custom cake bearing messages through images or texts as a 
symbolic expression, but it would not protect making a generic or artistically decorative cake either as a 
pure or symbolic expression.  
As to the free exercise argument, this thesis insists that this is a permissible rejection within the scope of 
the vendor's product options because it does not violate full and equal enjoyment, which could be 
interpreted as being the customer's equal access to goods and services based on the right of vendors to 
choose what to sell, as Justice Kagan stated. Furthermore, it argues that procedural-equal treatment should 
be given equal access to the vendors, including the vendors who decline to provide their goods and 
services due to religious and secular reasons when refusal is permissible. The differences between 
discriminatory declination and permissible rejection rely on whether the vendor could supply his goods or 
services to all other customers; in other words, the refusal is within the right of vendors to choose what to 
sell. Here, the official or government agency could have the discretion to determine whether the vendor’s 
refusal could be a discriminatory or conscientious declination. If they did not give the vendor 
opportunities to consider the reasons for refusals in a principled rationale, it could constitute a substantial 
burden on religious believers by deprivation. And then, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece should 
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I. THE LEGACY OF MASTERPIECE  
In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n,1 the Supreme Court confronted the conflict 
between eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation, which enforces social equality for 
LGBTQ people, and reassuring freedoms of religion and expression, which operates according to the 
limitation of compliance with the law. Aspirations for LGBTQ equality by social movements have been 
more influential than ever before, while social disregard for religion has gradually expanded. Most people 
are skeptical about religious exemptions because they could operate under the assumption that these 
exemptions give privilege to religious people.  
LGBTQ people claimed their rights in 1986, when anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation arose 
as a constitutional issue in Bowers v. Harwick.2 Even though it failed, there has been a continuing demand 
for decisions since then to recognize sexual liberty and non-discrimination due to sexual orientation. The 
Court recognized pervasive social discrimination against LGBTQ people in Romer v. Evans,3 which 
established the animus doctrine and assured heightened scrutiny. In Lawrence v. Texas4 of 2003, the Court 
established the sexual liberty of LGBTQs by abolishing laws against sodomy acts, and in United States v. 
Windsor,5 the Court declared the Federal Defense of Marriage Act6 unconstitutional for disallowing a tax 
refund and estate tax exemption for surviving spouses of same-sex marriage. Finally, in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,7 it allowed same-sex marriage as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment.8  
In opposition, since 1990, the Court discarded the favorable attitude toward the religious 
accommodations of Sherbert v. Verner.9 Instead, the Court established the Smith rule, which prevents the 
 
1 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
2 478 U.S. 186 (1986).   
3 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
4 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
5 570 U.S. 744 (2013).  
6 DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (DOMA) of 1996, 1 U.S.C. 7 (1996) (Struck down, June 26, 2013); In United States 
v. Windsor, the Court declared Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.   
7 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (Due Process Clause)  





challenge of religious exemptions when the law is generally applicable, whether or not the law imposes a 
substantial burden on religious practices in Employment Div. v. Smith.10  Religious groups and 
conservative politicians made their efforts to secure religious exemptions through legislation, such as the 
federal RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT (RFRA),11 RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT (RLUIPA)12 and state-RFRAs—another nickname is mini-RFRAs13—
against the government practices with which they did not agree concerning their beliefs.  
Eventually, the movements of both sides have led to conflicts in society. There were battles between 
conservatives and progressives in a political aspect, between believers with deeply held religious 
convictions and LGBTQ peoples concerning the pursuit of their liberty in a social aspect, and between 
civil rights movements to promote anti-discrimination acts for sexual orientations and RFRA legislation 
movements in a legal aspect.14 The predicted conflict between these two groups15 finally came to the 
surface through Masterpiece three years after the Court established the right to same-sex marriage as a 
fundamental right in 2015.16 
Masterpiece’s story is simply this. Phillips, who operated a local bakery Masterpiece Cakeshop, refused 
 
10 494 U.S.at 879 (1990).  
11 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §2000bb - 2000bb-4 (1993); The federal RFRA 
defined that “government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability” unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person – (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.” (42 U.S.C. §§2000bb1-(a), (b)).  
12 RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).  
13 RFRA states should apply strict scrutiny to religious rejection cases by balancing between government interests 
for protecting sexual orientation and religious freedom. Colorado did not enact RFRA, but there are 21 states which 
have RFRAs in 2015 - Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. (State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL (May 4. 2017) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx#RFRA).   
14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  
15 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy 
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N. C. L. REV. 375, 385-386 (1985), “heavy-handed judicial intervention
 was difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict”).    
16 The Court decision could influence society by instructing “which arguments seem legitimate and which parties 
deserve our sympathies.” (Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 





to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, Craig and Mullins, because Phillips said it was contradictory to 
his religious beliefs. Thus, according to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA),17 which bans 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Colorado Civil Rights Division issued a probable cause 
and referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission.18 The Commission found it proper to provide a 
formal hearing and sent the case to a State Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).19 Finally, ALJ determined 
that Phillips’ actions constituted prohibited discrimination in Craig and Mullins’s favor, based on sexual 
orientation. After the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s determination and remedial 
order,20 the United States Supreme Court heard the case and delivered its decision, which was divided 7–2 
in favor of Phillips. In the decision, the majority decided that the Colorado government agent 
compromised “neutral and respectful consideration,” which is religious neutrality when it showed “clear 
and impermissible hostility toward [Phillips’s] sincerely held religious belief” about marriage.21  
Masterpiece delivers two important social and political messages. First, the Supreme Court made 
efforts to strike a balance between a gay couple’s rights and religious rights by supporting both sides. It 
delivered to the public a message that the Court had given “neutral and respectful consideration” to both 
sides and was not driven by its political powers into this cultural and religious war. It was especially 
symbolic that Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court for religious liberty in this case, while 
he wrote the majority opinion in Obergefell, which decided to cast a vote in favor of same-sex marriage.  
Second, two progressive Justices cast cross-votes against their political roots. One of the Justices as a 
concurring opinion was Justice Beyer, nominated by President Clinton, and the other was Justice Kagan, 
nominated by President Obama.22 This cross-voting means the decisions of Justices were not affected by 
 
17 COLO. REV. STAT. (C.R.S.) §24-34-601 (2008, amended 2014)  
18 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1725-26. 
19 id. at 1726. 
20 id. at 1726-27.  
21 Justice Thomas further delivered his opinion that the government violated Phillips’ free speech rights. (id. at 
1740-48 (Thomas J., concurring). 







their political attitudes, and they depended only on their constitutional reasoning. In effect, their opinions 
were not against their supporters, because this opinion did not deny the gay couple’s rights, but only 
focused on the narrow duty of the governmental power, which means that the official should not treat 
ordinary religious people harshly even if society does not accept their opinions.  
However, this result was disappointing to both parties because the Court sidestepped the significant 
issues, of what value trumps the other, and submitted an ad hoc solution, which was fact-specific. It was a 
“pyrrhic victory” for the baker. He stopped creating wedding cakes23 and faced another lawsuit.24 
Moreover, LGBTQ people considered this decision as “a disappointing step backward.”25 
Therefore, this thesis aims at examining the validity of free speech claims for religious exemptions in 
light of the recent Supreme Court ruling, on the one hand, and reviewing the Court's position on the 
current complex entanglement of religious exemption theories, on the other hand; and finally, it provides 
a possible suggestion for two constitutional values, protecting religious expression and eradicating 
discrimination in public accommodations to coexist through the analysis of Masterpiece without an all-or-
nothing solution.  
To achieve this goal, this thesis reviews two constitutional claims: free speech and free exercise claims. 
First, as to the free speech claims, the symbolic speech doctrine and the compelled speech doctrine will be 
examined from the doctrinal perspective, and the constitutional scope of expression protection within 
 
(“Stephen G. Breyer: Nominated by former Pres. Bill Clinton, took seat Aug. 3, 1994 … Elena Kagan: Nominated 
by former Pres. Barack Obama, took seat Aug. 7, 2010”)  
23 Jack Phillips, I’m the Masterpiece Cakeshop baker. Will the Supreme Court uphold my freedom?, WASHINGTON 
POST (April 26, 2018 at 2:55 p.m. CDT) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-
baker-will-the-supreme-court-uphold-my-freedom/2018/04/26/3f04cf42-4896-11e8-827e-190efaf1f1ee_story.html  
24 Nico Lang, Masterpiece Cakeshop owner in court again for denying LGBTQ customer- Christian business owner 
Jack Phillips is being sued by a transgender woman who tried to order a trans-themed birthday cake from his 
Colorado bakery-, NBCnews (April 15, 2020, 2:30 PM CDT) https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-
out/masterpiece-cakeshop-owner-court-again-denying-lgbtq-customer-n1184656 
25 Tim Fitzsimons, 'Dangerous' or balanced? Bakery ruling elicits mixed reaction from LGBTQ groups - Gay rights 
groups are disappointed that a Colorado baker can refuse to make a wedding cake for a gay couple, but relieved 






commercialism will be reviewed from the policy perspective.26 Finally, this thesis will confirm that the 
free speech of religion can be protected to a minimum by the compelled speech doctrine. However, this 
would not save the majority of the religious people in the current Masterpiece case and public 
accommodations. 
Before reviewing the second free exercise claims, this thesis will explain what the constitutional 
attitude toward religious accommodations is to resolve confusion over the religious exemption, and will 
identify the legislative challenges and the judicial limitation surrounding the Smith rule and its 
exception.27 And then, comparing the confrontational interpretations of Masterpiece’s decision from both 
narrow and broad perspectives, this thesis presents possible candidate interpretations for religious 
exemptions that can protect both values while maintaining the court's view of the Smith rule. 28   
  
 
26 Chapter II deals with the free speech claims.  
27 Chapter III deals with the premises.  





II. FREE SPEECH CLAIMS   
Recently religious exemption claims in public accommodations have tended to include free speech 
claims.29 Free speech claims seem to be better than the argument relying on the religious exemption as to 
the Free Exercise Clause, which has obstacles in the Smith rule. Under the free speech jurisprudence, even 
if expressions of one’s beliefs are “offensive or irrational,”30 or “provocative and challenging,”31 the First 
Amendment protects that speech and prohibits state laws restricting that speech unless the laws satisfy 
strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the government cannot establish what speech is right and protected by 
determining what messages are offensive.32 So, religious objectors have accepted free speech claims for 
litigant tactics.33 
Generally, the public accommodation laws do not target any of the messages or viewpoints, but they 
regulate discriminatory acts. So, a rational basis review should be applied. The Court affirmed that those 
laws govern conduct only.34 However, if the conduct which the law targets is itself a form of pure 
expression, the review of the law could be subject to strict scrutiny.35 If it is expressive conduct, which 
means that expression exists together with conduct, intermediate scrutiny should be applied.36  
In Masterpiece, Phillips’ main argument was based on the Free Speech Clause, especially the 
 
29 Daniel O. Conkle, Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution: 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond, in LA LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION EN DROIT COMPARÉ [FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW] 2 (Gilles J. Guglielmi, ed.; Les Edition Panthéon-Assas, forthcoming 2020).    
30 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).  
31 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
32 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
region, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”)  
33 Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free Speech and Religious 
Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 384 (2004)); see, Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc, 389 P. 3d 
543, 511 (Wash. 2017), Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Pheonix, 448 P. 3d 890, 902 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018); Klein 
v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus, 410 P.3d 1051, 1064 (Or. Ct. App. 2017); Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F. 
3d 740, 750 (8th Cir. 2019); and Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.  
34 “The Court addressed a public accommodations law that did not on its face, target speech or discriminate on the 
basis of its content but focused on prohibiting the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of 
publicly available goods, privileges and services.”(Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)) 
35 See, Brush & Nib, 418 P. 3d at 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).  





compelled speech theory from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay.37 He believed creating cakes is “a form of 
art,” and he wanted to use his “artistic talents” for God.38 He argued his creation was an expression 
celebrating the customers’ weddings, which, in his view, is a combination of one man and one woman. 
His celebratory expression was not for same-sex marriage. However, the public accommodation law 
forced him to provide services for same-sex marriage by imposing penalties on him. So, he and his 
attorney, and amici curiae, argued that baking cakes constituted compelled speech because his conduct 
with artistic skills is inherently expressive. However, protection of his refusal as free speech or compelled 
speech might hurt the dignity of same-sex couples, whose protection was the purpose of the anti-
discrimination act.  
The Masterpiece Court did not allow for the free speech claims because it was difficult to view 
artistically decorative cakes as a form of expression.39 However, the Court suggested that some actions in 
public accommodations can be recognized as speech. Therefore, this chapter will review cases in which 
the Court considered whether the behavior of vendors, including bakers creating cakes, could be 
considered as expressive. 
The Court has recognized the symbolic speech doctrine that some actions could be expressive when 
they satisfy some requirements. Furthermore, the Court arguably established compelled speech, especially 
in the public accommodation law.  Considering the Court’s decisions, in future cases, the Court would 
likely protect a custom cake with a message through images or texts but would not recognize pure or 
artistically decorative cakes as speech.    
 
1. SYMBOLIC SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
37 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
38 Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. 370 P.3d 272, 276-77 (Co. Ct. App. 2015); Brief for Petitioners at 1-2, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).  





Under the First Amendment, expressive conducts are not explicitly protected, unlike “oral and written 
speech.”40 However, the Court affirmed expressive conduct as protected speech in several decisions 
because sometimes a straightforward behavior is more effective and powerful than one word “precisely 
because of its communicative attributes.”41 Moreover, “the line between speech and conduct … is not 
always clear.”42 The Court acknowledged, “symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating 
ideas.”43 It included actions such as burning the American flag,44 displaying a red flag,45 refusing to salute 
the American flag,46 burning a draft card,47 wearing a black armband,48 or wearing a uniform displaying 
the swastika.49 Those are examples of so-called “symbolic speech.” The Court has expanded this area of 
symbolic speech.50 
To affirm symbolic conduct as “inherently expressive,”51 the Court required two prongs of the Spence 
test: the speaker should intend to make the conduct “communicative,” which is a subjective condition, 
and a reasonable viewer should understand that the conduct is “communicative,” which is an objective 
condition.52 In this test, the most crucial factor that differentiates speech from other activities is only 
 
40 The First Amendment defined, "to the United States Constitution prevents the government from making laws 
which … abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press…” (U.S. CONST. amend. I. (Free Speech Clause)).    
41 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
42 Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P. 3d at 1225.  
43 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.  
44 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34.  
45 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).  
46 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632, 642 (1943).  
47 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 367-77 (1968); “The O'Brien test holds that, where speech is primarily "expressive" or 
"symbolic," the government can regulate it in accordance with a four-part test: (1) the law must be within the 
constitutional remit of the government; (2) it must further an important or substantial governmental interest that is 
(3) unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedom must be no greater than necessary to the furtherance of that interest.” (John G. Culhane, The Right to Say, 
But Not to Do: Balancing First Amendment Freedom of Expression with the Anti-Discrimination Imperative, 24 
WIDENER L. REV. 235, 240 (2018)).  
48 Tinker v. Des Moine Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-6 (1969).  
49 National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 53 (1977).  
50 It does so while the courts tried to limit “the broad wording of the first amendment.” (Ellen S. Podgor, Symbolic 
Speech, 9 IND. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1976)).  
51 Compare with Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006) (“Unlike a 
parade organizer's choice of parade contingents, a law school's decision to allow recruiters on campus is not 
inherently expressive.”) 
52 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405 (1974) and Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)) (“the conduct should be intended to be communicative” and “it should 





“communicative” property on both subjective and objective prongs. 
Justice Thomas’s opinion is a broad interpretation of communicability. He gave the only opinion 
supporting free speech claims. He indicated that the Spence requirements were satisfied by showing the 
baker’s affirmative participation in making each cake53 for the intentional condition, and he also 
explained wedding cake history concerning what the average person perceives54 to be the intention when 
the person finds a wedding cake in a ceremony55 for the reasonableness condition. If goods or services 
were used as a method of expression, they could be an expression. However, traditionally, cakes or food 
have not been acknowledged as a medium of expression,56 and there was no precedent.57 To assess 
communicability, he invoked intuition by comparing the act of creating cakes with nude dancing, which 
the Court recognized as a threshold for protected speech. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court 
recognized nude dancing could communicate an “erotic message,” but stated carefully that it is 
“expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, although only marginally.”58 He 
stated, “Phillips’ creation of custom wedding cakes … clearly communicates a message – certainly more 
 
53 “Phillips considers himself an artist… Behind the counter Phillips has a picture that depicts him as an artist 
painting on a canvas. Phillips takes exceptional care with each cake that he creates-sketching the design out on 
paper, choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and sculpting the cake, decorating it, 
and delivering it to the wedding.”(Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1742) (Thomas, J., concurring)  
54 When the average person see the wedding cake, the person can recognize that “a wedding has occurred, a 
marriage has begun, and the couple should be celebrated.” (id. at 1742-3 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
55 “to mark the beginning of a new marriage and to celebrate the couple” (Id. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
56 Professor Post also pointed it out. (Robert Post, An Analysis of DOJ's Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE, 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop (“It is for that 
reason that heightened First Amendment scrutiny has typically been reserved for laws that distort meanings 
conveyed in what the Court has called “media for the communication of ideas,” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 501 (1952), in which participants are understood to be self-consciously seeking to address public ideas and 
matters… It is quite clear that baking is not such a medium.”) 
57 Other Justices or most scholars are skeptical that it is expression. Justice Sotomayor mentioned, “the primary 
purpose of a food of any kind is to be eaten.”(Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111)) And Justice Kennedy stated that ordinary people 
seldom found a wedding cake as a protected speech.(Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (“[t]he free speech aspect of 
this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as 
an exercise of protected speech.”) ) Scholars supported this conclusion by arguing that traditionally cakes or food 
did not have been acknowledged “as a medium of expression.”   
58 Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. at 565-66; However, even though there was not one single opinion for majority, it was 






so than nude dancing.”59  
To support this opinion, one could offer the interpretation that the First Amendment has broadly 
protected the speech, which includes artistic expression, such as nude dancing and custom wedding 
cakes.60 They emphasize “artistic” skills. This art theory, which accepts artistic works as protected speech, 
can support this broad perspective. Several circuit courts confirmed this theory, such as the sixth, seventh, 
ninth, and tenth circuit courts.61  However, other circuits, and even the Supreme Court, never have done 
so. One reason why the Court did not accept this art theory might be that it is difficult to define what the 
art is. If the Court defines art as expressive conduct, it will cause more severe problems because all 
human activities are, to some degree expressive,62 so that protected speech claims could challenge most of 
all governmental actions, which restrict conduct. So, the Court should discern protected expressions from 
ordinary expressive activities of people’s lives.63  
Others argued in a narrow way that protected speech needs a particularized message requirement,64 
which means that the message entailed by the conduct should be able to be expressed in one or two 
sentences intended by the speaker. However, the Court did not require this additional requirement. As to 
Hurley, “[a] speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or 
by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”65 
 
59 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas J., concurring). 
60 Scott W. Gaylord, Is a Cake Worth a Thousand Words: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Impact of 
Antidiscrimination Laws on the Marketplace of Ideas, 85 TENN. L. REV. 361, 388 (2018). 
61 See, e.g. ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ’g. Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir, 2003); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 
759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985); White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2007); Cressman v. 
Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 952 (10th Cir. 2015); The 8th circuit court stated in its dicta, “there is no question that the 
government cannot compel an artist to paint” without precedent. (Telescope, 936 F. 3d at 752.); Dep’t of Fair Emp’t 
& Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., 2018 WL 747835 (Cal. Super. Ct., Bakersfield Dep’t, Feb. 5, 2018) (baking a 
wedding cake is artistic expression, and regulation unconstitutional under strict scrutiny). 
62 Post, supra note 56 (“We could multiply such examples indefinitely. American social life is filled with events that 
can legitimately be characterized as ‘deeply expressive.’”)  
63 Adam Liptak, Where Do Draw Line on Free Speech? Wedding Cake Case Vexes Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/us/politics/gay-wedding-cake-free-speech-first-amendment-supreme-
court.html (quoting Eugene Volokh) (“At some point, you have to decide what counts as speech and what doesn’t. 
Otherwise, all human behavior could be said to be expressive.”)  
64 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 286.   
65 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. (“a ‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 





So, the Court declared that a “narrow, succinctly articulable message”66 is not a condition of protected 
speech.  
Therefore, the promising final interpretation of communicability came from the majority’s opinion, 
which restricts protected speech case by case, relying on the burden of proof. Justice Kennedy pointed out 
the substantial likelihood that some sort of public accommodation activities are expressive even though he 
seemed to be denying the symbolic speech argument for merely making wedding cakes. Kennedy 
considered that the results would be different from Masterpiece when the order from a customer was 
“cakes with words or images celebrating the wedding.”67 Justice Ginsburg agreed with this opinion.68 
Given that the Court did not consider “written or spoken words” 69 as “a condition of constitutional 
protection,”70 those elements can be understood as a kind of index for communicability71 to limit 
protected speech practically, but not theoretically.72 
By reference to recent lower courts’ decisions, the Court would not likely acknowledge creative works, 
such as custom wedding cakes73 or floral arrangements,74 as a form of expression. The lower courts and 
 
66 Id. at 558.  
67 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.  
68 “As the Court recognizes, a refusal “to design a special cake with words or images . . . might be different from a 
refusal to sell any cake at all.”” Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
69 The Colorado Court of Appeals also can support this argument because it already “acknowledged that ‘a wedding 
cake, in some circumstances, may convey a particularized message celebrating [a] same-sex marriage,’ depending 
on its ‘design’ and whether it has ‘written inscriptions.’” (Mullins, 370 P.3d at 288). 
70 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1738. 
71 However, it does not mean that this conduct should have particularized messages (Gaylord, supra note 60, at 394).   
72 Protected speech is “special.” Some scholars tried to establish the special elements for protected speech, such as 
the pursuing values through free speech. (Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the Speech in Freedom of Speech, 
116 Mich. L. Rev. 667, 680-681 (2018)) However, there is no agreement on how to distinguish protected speech 
from unprotected speech, or symbolic speech from mere conduct. Thus, the Court seemed to recognize the 
difference between them as it decided historically, rather than theoretically. See, e.g. Telescope Media, 936 F. 3d at 
750-51 (“The Larsens' videos are a form of speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection. The Supreme 
Court long ago recognized that “expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free 
press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502; see also Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981). Indeed, "[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a 
significant medium for the communication of ideas." Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501. "They [can] affect public 
attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle 
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.” Id.”)  
73 Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus, 410 P.3d at 1064-74, especially at 1072-73.  





state courts restrict their extensive applications by repeating precedents, such as making wedding films,75 
or at best accepting a few exceptions, only where the goods or services included words or images, such as 
wedding invitations76 or T-shirt designs with words celebrating a same-sex wedding.77 However, others, 
such as floral arrangements, collecting wedding albums, or baking wedding cakes, were not accepted 
because the state or lower courts treated them as unprotected conduct.78 All these decisions depended on 
whether goods or services have words, images, and the like.  
In the case of a baker, the Court would protect making a cake bearing messages through images or texts 
as a symbolic expression, but it would not protect making a generic, artistically-decorative cake as either 
a pure or symbolic expression. Therefore, if creative works are protected speech as expressive conduct, 
intermediate scrutiny should be applied according to the O’Brien test when the government restricts those 
expressive conducts.  
 
2. COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE  
If a vendor declines those provisions to protected classes, the public accommodation law can force him 
or her to provide those goods and services to these classes. However, if the conduct forced by the 
government according to this law is expressive, it can constitute compelled speech, in which case, strict 
scrutiny should apply.  
The reason why compelled speech violates free speech rights is that the First Amendment protects not 
only a right to speak but also a right to be silent and refrain from speaking.79 So, free speech includes 
 
75 Telescope Media, 936 F. 3d at 750-51.  
76 “Plaintiffs' custom wedding invitations, and the process of creating them, are protected by the First Amendment 
because they are pure speech. Each custom invitation created by Duka and Koski contains their hand-drawn 
words, images, and calligraphy, as well as their hand-painted images and original artwork. Additionally, Duka 
and Koski are intimately connected with the words and artwork contained in their invitations.” [emphasis added] 
(Brush & Nib Studio, 418 P. 3d at 908)).  
77 Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, 592 S.W. 3d 291 (Ky, 2019). 
78 See, e.g. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P. 3d at 1228; Klein, 410 P.3d at 526.  





ensuring the “autonomy over the message.”80 It means “choices of what to say and what to leave 
unsaid.”81 The speech “may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the 
messages expressed on private property are those of the owner”82 because the First Amendment not only 
protects “a speaker’s desired message but also ensures that the government cannot conscript a speaker’s 
properties to serve as a courier for another’s message.” If the government action constitutes compelled 
speech, the courts should apply strict scrutiny. Even if the creative works compelled are expressive 
conduct where intermediate scrutiny should be applied, compelled speech claims can bring strict scrutiny 
to the case.83  
The public accommodation laws do not target speech but conduct, so it does not consist of compelled 
speech.84 However, the Court in Hurley had recognized that compelled speech theory could apply to 
public accommodations in a particular application, where the law applies to expressive conduct.85 In 
Hurley, a parade organizer planned a parade event, and she picked who would participate in the parade.86 
She prevented a gay organization from performing in her parade, and her denial could consist of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation under the public accommodation law.87 So, the state forced the 
private parade operator to add the unit of the gay organization with whose speech the operator did not 
agree.88 The Court held that the parade was a form of expression and that forcing the operator to add the 
unit constituted compelled speech by altering the operator’s speech.89 So, the state government violated 
 
80 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. [capitalized and emphasis added] 
81 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 475 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1986) 
(plurality opinion)) 
82 Pac. Gas. 475 U.S. at 12 (plurality opinion) (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 (1980) 
(Powell, J. concurring)) 
83 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577. 
84 Id. at 572 (the laws typically focus “on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly 
available goods, privileges, and services on the proscribed grounds.”)  
85 Id. at 572-73; Gaylord, supra note 60, at 403 (“if application of a public accommodations law targets speech or 
discriminates on the basis of its content, then the statute has the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to be 
the public accommodation.”[quotation mark omitted]) 
86 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 560-61.  
87 Id. 561-62.  
88 Id. 562-63.  





the First Amendment free speech right of the operator.  
However, there are two rebuttals against compelled speech claims in public accommodations. One is 
attribution theory, which asserts that when the wedding cakes deliver a message of celebrating a same-sex 
marriage, “that message is more likely to be attributed to the customer than to”90 the baker from the 
perspective of reasonable persons so that it does not constitute compelled speech. The other is compliance 
theory, which insists that when the baker’s action is merely to serve his customers equally by abiding by 
the law, it does not convey a message with which he disagrees from the perspective of reasonable 
persons.91 However, the Court would not be likely to accept these arguments, because it did not establish 
the additional prongs according to the attribution and compliance theories, so that the compelled speech 
idea could succeed if and only if the conduct is expressive under the symbolic doctrine.  
  (1) Likelihood of Misattribution   
The Mullins court decided that the observers would not attribute the ordered message to the baker92 
when the baker accommodates the speech of others, such as customers, through expressive conduct. On 
the contrary, in Hurley, even though the parade accommodates other speakers in units and showed the 
mixed expressions of each unit, the Court determined that it was speech because the spectators considered 
each unit’s expression as a part of the whole93 as if the operator intended to show it. This determination 
means that the operator in Hurley was speaking, so that the parade’s message may be changed with the 
other unit’s speech.  
However, the Mullins court stated that when the vendor is not speaking, it does not constitute compelled 
speech relying on PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins.94 In this case, some students distributed 
 
90 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 286; The New Mexico court advances the same point: “It may be that Elane Photography 
expresses its clients’ messages in its photographs, but only because it is hired to do so.” Elane Photography, LLC. V. 
Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M. 2013) 
91 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 286.  
92 Id. at 287.  
93 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577.  





pamphlets in a shopping center, which was open to the public. However, the private owner of the 
shopping center prohibited their speech on the premises. The Court held that a shopping center owner 
should permit a particular speech on its property under the state law. Even if the allowed speech is 
different from his opinion, the Court upheld this law because ordinary persons think that the opinions 
delivered in the pamphlets could not be identified with the owner when the owner did not engage in 
speech activities. Furthermore, the owners could dissociate themselves from those opinions because they 
could post notice of a disclaimer that they disagree with the messages and that this conduct was intended 
to comply with the law.95 Here, the Court focused on two issues: whether the owner is speaking and 
whether there are any disclaimers to avoid a misattribution.    
However, this conclusion is inconsistent with Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com.96  The 
facts in Pacific Gas were the same pattern as in PruneYard. The gas company was forced to accommodate 
a third-party, to include its newsletter in the company’s billing envelopes and distribute them to the 
company’s customers under the state law.97 If the Court would have followed PruneYard’s reasoning, this 
compulsion should not have constituted compelled speech because the spectators would likely know who 
the author of the message was. 
Furthermore, the company had a disclaimer, stating that it was not the opinion of the company in its 
envelope. However, the Pacific Gas Court held it was unconstitutional. It stated that the disclaimer did 
not require the company to be forced to react to the third party’s message when it disagrees with the 
message.98  
The Mullins court interpreted that the inconsistency between PruneYard and Pacific Gas was related to 
the method of conscription of speech dissemination, stating “that the government may not commandeer a 
 
95 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (“signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain 
that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state law.”)  
96475 U.S. 1 (1986); Gaylord, supra note 60, at 409-10.  
97 Pac. Gas. 475 U.S. at 20-21; Mullins, 370 P.3d at 284.  
98 Pac. Gas. 475 U.S. at 15 n.11 (plurality opinion) (“nothing to reduce the risk that [the company] will be forced to 





private speaker’s means of accessing its audience by requiring that the speaker disseminate a third-
party’s message [emphasis added].”99 However, this interpretation concluded too early because it did not 
consider the possibility of the right not to speak. While the case is related to the governmental use of the 
speech method as well as to the right to be silent, the more critical question is about whether the 
government intervened in the right not to speak, which the free speech jurisprudence protects through the 
compelled speech doctrine.  
One promising interpretation is that when the government “force[s] a [vendor] to respond to the 
unwanted message,” it is unconstitutional no matter to whom the reasonable person thinks that the 
message would belong.100 Pacific Gas means that a person who is forced to express speech with which he 
or she disagrees does not necessarily engage in his own speech to constitute compelled speech. However, 
in PruneYard, the owner has a lesser possibility of being forced to respond to the unwanted message. 
Therefore, compelled speech would increase the “likelihood of misattribution” of reasonable persons.101 
In this context, between PruneYard and Pacific Gas, there are two differences. The first one is related to 
whether there are risks of misattribution when the speaker accommodates the third-party’s speech. In 
PruneYard, the premises were open to the public, so that there was less possibility of misunderstanding 
the third party’s message as being equivalent to the owner’s message. By contrast, in Pacific Gas, the 
third-party’s message was delivered through the company’s private means to communicate to its 
customers so that there was a high risk of misattribution between the company and the third-party.102  
Second is related to the meaning of a disclaimer. In PruneYard, the disclaimer was an exemption from 
compelled speech, while the disclaimer was insufficient to require the compelled speech in Pacific Gas. 
This interpretation is applicable to Hurley as well.   
 
99 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 284. 
100 Gaylord, supra note 60, at 410.  
101 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577. (“without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of misattribution”)  
102 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 12 (1986) (plurality opinion); “concern that access to this [public] area might affect the 
shopping center owner’s exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the 





Accordingly, in public accommodations, when a vendor is forced to provide goods or services with 
messages with which he or she disagrees, the likelihood of misattribution is meant to be about compelled 
speech, but not about the responses to compelled speech.103  So, the Mullins court’s statement is 
misleading: “the public has no way of knowing the reasons supporting [the baker]’s decision to serve or 
decline to serve a same-sex couple”104 because the court stated the responses.105 
Because the vendor speaks through the provision of goods or services in public accommodations, 
commentators refuse to apply Hurley’s peculiar application to the ordinary vendor case because the 
vendor is not speaking privately. However, if the likelihood of misattribution increases when the vendor 
creates the goods and services with the ordered message with which he or she disagrees, this compulsion 
may violate the right not to speak. In other words, this would be the same result regardless of whether the 
vendor is speaking.  
(2) Compliance theory  
Even after solving the misattribution rebuttal, one big issue which remains is compliance theory. The 
Mullins court stated that “a reasonable observer would understand that its compliance with the law [was] 
not a reflection of its own beliefs,”106 even if the government forces a baker to accommodate others’ 
messages with which he or she disagrees. This court relied on Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc.,107 as precedent.  
In Rumsfeld, law schools declined military recruiters’ requests to gain access to their students because 
 
103 Justice Kennedy did not answer this question and simply pointed out that the Colorado Division recognized the 
messages on the cakes as the bakers’ speech in other cases, Jack’s cases; and then in Phillips case, they determined 
that Phillips’ cake was not attributed to the baker but to the customer. However, there were no Court’s review or 
denial against the Colorado’s standard. (Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730) (“any message the requested wedding cake 
would carry would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any 
of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism.”) 
104 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 287.   
105 Arlene’s flower, 389 P. 3d at 557 (2017) (“an outside observer may be left to wonder whether a wedding was 
declined for one of at least three reasons: a religious objection, insufficient staff, or insufficient stock.”)  
106 Mullins. 370 P.3d at 276.  





they disagreed with the military’s policies, which was the “don’t ask don’t tell” policy.  So, the 
government refused funding to the school under federal law.108 The law school argued that the law forced 
them to send “the message that they see nothing wrong with the military’s policies” when they treat 
military recruiters like nonmilitary ones.109 Precedent restricts the government from requiring that an 
individual “speak the government’s message.”110 However, the Court responded that the spectators such 
as “students” would distinguish between “speech [that] a school sponsors” from “speech the school 
permits because [the school is] legally required to do so.”111 This means that, from the reasonable person’s 
perspective when the vendor is forced to accommodate others’ speech, this enforcement constitutes 
compliance with the law rather than compelled speech. The Mullins court followed Rumsfeld’s 
reasoning.112    
However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Wooley v. Maynard.113 The Wooley Court held that 
forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the “Live Free or Die” government slogan on his license plate was 
unconstitutional.114 The Jehovah should deliver government speech. If the Court had applied this 
reasonableness standard to Wooley like Rumsfeld’s reasoning, the result might have been different from 
Wooley’s original decision because reasonable observers would not likely attribute the statements 
represented on an official license plate to the drivers of such standard plates, but they might have 
concluded that the person just pursued a legal requirement.115   This difference was related to the 
reasonable person's standard, which was used in Rumsfeld, but not in Wooley. Considering this 
inconsistency, it is dubious that the reasonableness standard is a well-established constitutional theory.  
Even without the reasonableness standard, there is another difference between Rumsfeld and Wooley. In 
 
108 Id. at 64-65.  
109 Id. at 64-65.  
110 Id. at 63.  
111 Id. at 65. 
112 Mullins. 370 P.3d at 286.  
113 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
114 Id. at 715-17. 





Rumsfeld, it appeared neither that the law schools accepted the military recruiters’ policies as a speech, 
nor that the law limited the law schools’ speech opposing the military’s policies.116 Here, the point is that 
the government forcing conduct was not identified as speech with which the schools disagree, so there 
was nothing to be compelled.117   
   Therefore, when the government forces vendors to accommodate other’s messages or to alter the 
vendor’s message to other’s speech, with which he or she disagrees, it would likely constitute compelled 
speech as long as creating goods or services are expressive. This is because it would violate the right to 
autonomy over the content of the vendor’s own speech, even for compliance with the law.   
As long as conduct providing goods or services constitute a form of speech, expressive conduct, it would 
likely constitute compelled speech when the public accommodation laws force the vendors to provide 
goods or services, including a message with which he or she disagrees. In other words, a compelled 
speech argument should succeed if, and only if, the vendor’s good or service is expressive according to 
the meaning of the Free Speech Clause.  
 
3. UNSUCCESSFUL ARGUMENT TO LIMIT A VENDORS’ RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS  
 Many commentators have worried about opening a floodgate of religious expression for 
businesspersons against public accommodation laws when this idea of broad protected speech protection 
operates without restrictions in public accommodations.118 This is because the dominant view of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution is the minimization of government intervention. Therefore, as long as it is 
 
116 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65; Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2016) 
(“[n]othing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and nothing in the 
Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say about the military's policies.”)  
117 Id.   
118 Opposing with Gaylord, supra note 60, at 412 (“The relatively few First Amendment challenges to public 





protected speech, requests for religious expression in public accommodations will be brought to bear on a 
broad acceptance of exceptions, as opposed to narrow ones. Some commentators have said many 
businesspersons are engaged in creative work, such as designing clothing or architecture, and that they 
would rely on this speech claim for their refusals.119 This is precisely the concern of the majority in 
Masterpiece.   
The dominant perspective of the Court on the Free Speech of the First Amendment is based on a 
marketplace of ideas theory.120 This means that the government should abstain from interfering with 
individual liberty because each theory or idea will succeed on its own merit under minimal government 
intervention. This brought a laissez-faire approach to the regulation of speech and expression.121  The 
Court has recognized unprotected speech in a few areas, such as incitement to obscenity, defamation, 
fighting words, fraud, speech integral to criminal conduct, child pornography, genuine threats, imminent 
lawless action, and so forth.122 Other than these categories, the Court has been unwilling to add other 
forms of expression under its regulations.123  
To solve this problem, there are two possible suggestions: one is to exclude the expression of for-profit 
businesspersons, and the other is to reduce the scope of protected speech for expressive conduct in public 
accommodations by narrowly interpreting the symbolic speech doctrine.    
The first suggests considering the for-profit expressive conduct as categorical unprotected speech. One 
commentator tried to limit this expressive conduct in public accommodations, by relying on those values 
that free speech jurisprudence pursues, such as “democratic self-governance, autonomy, truth-seeking, or 
 
119 Professor Greene pointed out two tiers of criticisms: that vendor’s products are not protected speech because they 
are ordered from their customers; and even if they are protected speech, this recognition will open the door to “all 
sorts of businesspersons as similarly covered.” (Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some 
Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667, 679 (2019))  
120 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. established this theory as a legal concept in his dissenting opinion of Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  
121 Gaylord, supra note 60, at 373 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 161 
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“…under the laissez-faire regime”)) 
122 Gaylord, supra note 60, at 374; Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2016). 





distrust of government.”124 Most commentators understand that there should be a distinction. However, 
there is no agreement about what the overriding value should be in free speech jurisprudence. Therefore, 
drawing this line is not about setting a clear and robust standard, but about asking what to consider as a 
matter of degree.125 
One may argue that the vendors accept the premise that a business is a place of public accommodations 
and that they should comply with the rule of anti-discrimination.126 One of the reasons behind this idea is 
based on the interpretation of Hurley’s peculiar application.127 Scholars who declined to apply Hurley in 
public accommodations argued that Hurley’s reasoning could be available except to the operator because 
a parade is not a general activity in public accommodations, which are for-profit through transactions. The 
operator in Hurley was a non-profit entity. However, generally, vendors’ activities in public 
accommodations are for-profit, and the requests of customers cause the relationship.  
To restrict the vendor’s free speech in pursuing profit is an attempt to exclude certain groups from 
complying with free speech protections. However, this attitude is inconsistent with recent decisions of the 
 
124 Kendrick, supra note 72, at 680-681; Scholars tried to distinguish speech forms of activities as protected speech 
from other economic activities. Some argued commercial speech cannot be protected speech under the autonomy 
theory. (Id, at 703, citing from Seana Valentine Shiferin, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 
98-102 (2014); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 996 
(1978)); The other is to distinguish commercial speech from protected speech, focusing on the question on what the 
people think is the essence of free speech jurisprudence. Even if it is difficult to determine which value is the core of 
free speech jurisprudence, the existence of drawing the line between them becomes clear. At that time, the essential 
question is not whether it is necessary to distinguish protected speech from other activities, including commercial 
activitism but what elements should be required to distinguish protected speech from other activity. (Kendrick, 
supra note 72, at 703). (“it has clarified what is necessary to answer such questions: a view about what sets 
"freedom of speech" apart from the protection given to other activity, including economic activity. Such a view will 
tell us which activities implicate freedom of speech and which do not.”)  
125 Id. at 686. (“That is, (1) how distinguishable is an activity covered by a right from [an] activity outside of it, and 
(2) how much protection should it get?”)  
126 For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals decided that “the vendors accept the premise that the business is a 
place of public accommodation under the law and that it must generally open its doors to customers of all sexual 
orientations, regardless of vendors’ religious views about homosexuality.” (see, Klein, 410 P.3d at 531). 
127 Conkle, supra note 29, at 24 n. 109 (he argued, “The First Amendment provides stronger protection in certain 
noncommercial settings, sometimes permitting objectors to resist the application of anti-discrimination laws even 





Court. In 2018, there were two compelled speech-related decisions, Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31,128 and 
NIFLA v. Becerra.129 The Court “expressly rejected a similar categorical argument that sought to exclude 
a class of speakers,” such as public employees, “from the First Amendment’s protection against 
compelled speech,”130 because this exclusion would “empower [] states to manipulate public discussion 
and deny citizens an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”131 This 
exclusion can undermine the bedrock principle of free speech. 
To be sure, sometimes a business practice, such as a commercial advertisement, can be restricted even if 
it is related to free speech.132 The Hurley Court also stated that the state could “prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in commercial advertising.”133 However, it also is limited for and only for preventing customers 
from being confused or deceived.134 It is consistent with the free speech jurisprudence that fraudulent 
speech could not be protected.135 However, “outside that context, it may not compel [speech] with which 
the speaker disagrees.”136 When public accommodations law manages the operation of the business and 
the activities controlled by the business operation are deemed to be a speech, it could be protected by the 
free speech clause.137 Thus, the constitutional interpretation cannot limit the scope of free speech or of 
 
128 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018) (holding that collection of the union fee from non-union members violates the First Amendment right to 
free speech of non-union members)  
129 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (holding that the requirement 
that licensed covered facilities give notice regarding publicly provided family planning services unduly burdened 
protected speech “by imposing a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that was wholly 
disconnected from California’s informational interest.”)   
130 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469-70.  
131 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for 
treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”); James 
A. Campbell, Compelled Speech in Masterpiece Cakeshop: What the Supreme Court’s June 2018 Decisions Tell Us 
About the Unresolved Questions, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 142, 149 (2018). 
132 So, another theory tries to narrow down commercial limitation to the business settings. It focuses on the fact that 
the public accommodations laws deal with “business operation,” or business practice, which contained decisions to 
avoid selling or creating customer’s requests based on the protected traits, especially sexual orientation. (Elane 
Photography, 309 P.3d at 68.) 
133 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 [citation omitted] 
134 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
135 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 385 F.Supp. 3d 1147, 1154 (D. Colo. 2019) 
136 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 [citation omitted] 





groups protected by the First Amendment because they are engaged in commerce. 
   The second suggests heightening the threshold of protected speech by narrowing down the scope of 
symbolic speech, at least in the commercial context.138 However, such an attempt is to confuse what 
should be protected speech and what values can take priority.  In determining what protected speech is, it 
is not necessary to consider government interests. It will be reviewed in the balancing test between harm 
to protect rights and other government interests.139 Free speech is not an absolute right so that the Court 
would give priority to the value of full and equal enjoyment without discrimination, in that public 
accommodations are the space that satisfies the most basic needs of man rather than functioning as a 
discourse. To be sure, as previously stated, to avoid this consequence, the opinion of the majority in 
Masterpiece narrowed down the scope of symbolic speech in a practical sense, stating that a cake with 
words or images could result in a different judgment.140  
 
In sum, the Free Speech doctrine can protect the vendor’s good or services as speech, if, and only if, the 
vendor’s good or service is expressive according to the Free Speech Clause. Thus, in the case of a baker, 
the Court would protect making a cake bearing messages through images or texts as a symbolic 
expression, but it would not protect making a generic, artistically decorative cake as either a pure or 
symbolic expression. As a result, a baker’s compelled speech argument should prevail in the first 
situation, when the cake includes messages through images or texts. In other words, the public 
accommodations law could not be used to require a baker to make a cake with which he or she disagrees. 
However, this should not prevail on a compelled speech theory in Masterpiece itself.   
Religious objectors have accepted free speech claims as litigant tactics.141 However, what they want to 
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do is not speech but exercise their own religious convictions. So, rather than putting the free speech 
doctrine at risk, giving new interpretations may be more appropriate to meet their needs for free exercise 
in a new context, of how their beliefs might conflict with other constitutional values.142  
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III. PREMISES FOR UNDERSTANDING FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 
The Masterpiece Court drew only fact-specific conclusions, that did not give any solution or guidance 
for solving the same issues, even though it reviewed almost every issue that could be addressed in the free 
exercise jurisprudence. Two weeks after Masterpiece, when the Court had another chance to decide this 
question, it was unwilling to arrive at a resolution “between religious freedom and LGBT equality”143 in 
State v. Arlene’s Flowers.144 The next year in 2019, when the Court confronted a similar baker case in 
Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus,145 the Justices’ conclusion was to follow Masterpiece’s rule after a 
long consideration.146 
To understand the reasons behind this requires the answering of the following issues: first of all, 
considering what the fundamental principles of constitutional attitudes are toward religion, and secondly, 
how the dynamics of legislative movements and judicial interpretations have changed attitudes toward 
religious beliefs since the Smith decision in 1990. 
Before reviewing Masterpiece’s application of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah147 as a 
precedent, this chapter describes the rules and their historical development to define the core arguments of 
Masterpiece and their historical status. Particularly, this is done to identify which conception of religious 
equality developed through religious exemptions can best help us to understand the neutrality which the 
courts were trying to demonstrate through Lukumi. In conclusion, the Court would pursue procedural-
equal treatment that applies for permissible exemptions in general toward religious exemptions since the 
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Smith Court declared the rule of general applicability, rather than substantive-equal treatment for 
impermissible religious accommodations under the Sherbert test in the pre-Smith era.  
 
1. TWO IDEALS OF EQUALITY AND ITS EMBODIMENT IN THE EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
   Religious accommodations seem to be a privilege toward religion. Under the Lemon test, the 
government violates the Establishment Clause “if the government’s primary purpose is to advance 
religion, or if the principal effect is to aid or inhibit religion, or if there is excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”148 The Court has recognized that it is impermissible under the establishment 
clause when the government facilitates a particular religious practice.149 Otherwise, it may violate the free 
exercise clause when the government tries to refrain from accommodating religious practices. This 
tension is inherent in the First Amendment, and many scholars have tried to reconcile this tension.150  
   This issue can be reduced to conflict among equality conceptions. This is because the establishment 
works for formal equality between religions and non-religions as well as among religions, but free 
exercise seeks to guarantee substantive equality by accommodating politically unpopular religions. 
Therefore, this part reviews two ideals of equality necessary to understand religious exemptions; 
substantive equality, and formal or procedural equality. And finally, it concludes that the understanding of 
the religious exemption changed from substantive-equal treatment, which protected particularity of 
religious practices even when the exemption is generally impermissible, to procedural-equal treatment, 
which allows hearing the religious exemptions when the exemption is generally permissible.   
  (1) treat like alike, unlike differently, and never do wrong 
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   The equality in the Constitution reflects two axioms: never to do people wrong151 and to treat like cases 
alike and unlike cases differently.152 The former is a general principle, so that religious freedom also 
entails this ideal as religious equality. The latter can be well-explained in the equal protection clause. It 
“requires the state to treat similarly-situated persons similarly, or to provide a sufficient justification for 
any dissimilar treatment.”153 It also can be embodied in full and fair enjoyment of fundamental rights.154    
   The former starts with the idea that one should not treat others unfairly or wrongfully. It can go further 
to the idea that officials should not treat certain groups with hostility caused by racism or sexism. The 
meaning of the Equal Protection is understood to “guard one part of society against the injustice of the 
other part.”155 It can be realized “by checking the tendency of legislative majorities to be vindictive.”156 
Professor Carpenter viewed its origin as Note 4 in United States v. Carolene Products:157 “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities … tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” 
   The animosity towards certain groups can cause the legislative process to be “poisoned and 
poisonous”158 with unfairness. These groups could not influence the political and democratic process due 
to political unpopularity so that they would likely not be protected. The animus doctrine defined animus 
or hostility as “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”159 It cannot constitute a 
 
151 Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection form Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185 (2013) 
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group of people.”) (Citing John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 157 (1980) 
(“To disadvantage a group essentially out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern and respect, 
specifically by valuing their welfare negatively.”)) 
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legitimate governmental interest.160 The animus doctrine implies the correctness of injustice through 
judicial holdings. Thus, the anti-animus argument is more meaningful and useful for targeted minorities 
than for targeted groups. They have fundamental rights or are classified as such under the Constitution 
because the animus gives minorities weapons to strike down the legitimacy with which the law 
discriminates against them, and to which the judiciary defers. Arguments based on the violation of 
fundamental rights such as religious freedoms or equal protection based on race or gender, can guarantee 
strict scrutiny without the animus argument. However, minorities who are outside of those constitutional 
protections could rely on the animus doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause, so that the standard of 
review of the law targeting minorities should be heightened scrutiny. Even if the animus doctrine for 
equal protection is favorable to the unclassified minorities, anti-animus equal treatment could be fully 
admitted to ensure religious equality for recognition of discrimination but not for heightened scrutiny.   
   The latter is two-fold: that of treating likes alike, and of that treating unlikes differently. The lower 
courts described this principle well as it is embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which “requires the state to treat similarly-situated person[] similarity, or to provide a 
sufficient justification for any dissimilar treatment.”161 
   The former means treating persons equally. “When two persons have [an] equal status in at least one 
normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this respect.”162 It can be viewed 
as “formal equality.” This requires that the government should treat them equally when one is “similarly-
situated” to another.163  
However, sometimes this equal treatment without consideration of specific situations of where a person 
is located could bring inequality to him or her. So, the latter is required. It implies the need to treat 
persons as equals, with equal concern and respect. All persons are equal because they have equal dignity 
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so that the government should treat them with neutral and respectful consideration of their differences. 
This can be understood as “substantive equality.”  
(2) What Conception of Equality the Sherbert Test Pursues and the Smith Decision 
Religious equality generally means that discrimination against particular religions by the government 
should be prohibited, including animus-driven discrimination.164 Religious freedom requires the 
government to accommodate free exercise according to religious convictions, such as religious 
exemptions.165 This accommodation seems to give particular religious conduct privilege in comparison 
with other secular conducts that are subject to the law of general applicability. The Constitution limits the 
free exercise of religion under the Establishment Clause.166  
Professor McConnell came up with two different theories over religious exemptions against the burden 
government imposes on religious liberty. First, the no-exemption theory explains that the purpose of free 
exercise is only “to prevent [the] government from singling out [a] religious practice for peculiar 
disability”167 due to religious tenets when “laws … directly and intentionally penalize religious 
observance.”168 The law is neutral toward religions when it pursues only secular purposes without aiming 
at religious practices. This could be understood as formal or procedural equality.169 In other words, free 
exercise requires equal treatment between religious and secular conduct.170 When the exemptions for 
other secular conscientious reasons are permissible, the religious exemption should also be required under 
this no-exemption theory.  
 
164 Conkle, supra note 29, at 4. This is generally accepted.  
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Under the exemption theory, free exercise requires religious exemption even when government actions 
have “incidental or unintended effects” on religious actions.171 It includes such elements as “majoritarian 
presuppositions, ignorance, and indifference,” as well as hostility towards religion.172 The theory concerns 
not only discrimination over religion in general but also with disparate consideration towards religious 
minorities. So, it assures the idea that judicially recognized exemptions which remove the hierarchy 
among religious groups should give religious minorities equal opportunity to obey religious tenets 
according to their religious convictions.173 This sensitive treatment for religious groups can be understood 
as substantive equality,174 which includes “indirect discrimination or disparate impact, reasonable 
accommodation, affirmative action, systemic discrimination, and unfair discrimination.”175  In other 
words, this theory can argue that, even when the exemptions for any secular conscientious reasons are not 
permissible, the religious exemption should also be required for resolving the injustice that democratic 
procedures could not be used due to religious minorities.    
One big difference between these theories is how to deal with the facially neutral law. This is the case 
where there are no other secular exceptions. A religious believer cannot challenge this law according to 
the no-exemption theory.176 Religious exemptions would not be acceptable if there is no secular and 
general conscientious exemption, similarly situated with a religious one. However, under the exemption 
theory, a religious objector can be entitled to have careful consideration from the standpoint of a religious 
person.177 This can be considered as religious sensitivity.178 Religious exemptions would be acceptable if 
the burden is imposed on certain religious practices, even when there is no secular and general 
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conscientious exemption.  
 
2. THE SMITH RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS  
Most commentators have emphasized that religious accommodations, including religious exemptions, 
are protected as “a basic constitutional value.”179 The religious exemption was recognized in the Sherbert 
test, which requires strict scrutiny when the government substantially imposes burdens on religious 
conduct. This comes from a view of substantive equality for religious exemptions. 
The Court kept this stance toward religious exemption before 1990. It pursued the Sherbert test that 
says government action, which imposes a substantial burden on religious practice, can be justified when it 
has the least means to achieve a compelling government interest. However, the Court changed its attitude 
toward formal equality in 1990. This was called the Smith rule and held that religious exemptions could 
not challenge government action that is generally applicable. However, there has been controversy over 
the thirty years related to the issue of where the Court should place its position on religious exemption 
between Smith and Sherbert.   
Therefore, this part determines that the court's attitude toward religious exemptions has shifted from 
substantial-equal treatment to procedural-equal treatment unless the religious practices are directly related 
to religious doctrine or operative determination of religious institutions or institutions. Smith's 
interpretation of the Sherbert test can also be understood consistently in terms of this procedural equality. 
This development related to these exemptions would become the basis for the understanding of 
Masterpiece. To confirm, this part reviews some kinds of religious exemptions in Smith’s dicta and the 
attitude of the judgments after Smith. 
 
 





(1) The Smith Rule and neutrality  
In Smith, a religious believer who consumed peyote for a worship purpose under the tenets of the 
Native American Church, which taught digestion of peyote in its central ritual,180 was fired due to his 
attendance of the religious peyote service. When he applied for unemployment compensation, the 
government refused his claim because peyote use was banned and criminalized under Oregon law. The 
Court established the Smith rule, “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”181 Finally, according to this rule, the 
Court held that the law was not aimed at promoting or restricting religious beliefs and therefore did not 
violate the free exercise clause.182  
The Court in pre-Smith was in favor of religious believers. The Court followed the Sherbert test that, if 
the government imposes a substantial burden on religious objectors, it should have a compelling interest 
to be achieved by restrictive means. In this context, the religious exemption recognized in the Sherbert 
test would likely come from substantive equality because it cares for the particular situation of religious 
beliefs and its practices. However, the Smith rule seeks formal equality because it was grounded on the 
idea that all humans are equal.  
However, the court did not strictly pursue Smith's rule. The court said that during analysis, Smith had 
opened up another interpretation for the exceptions of the Smith rule by explaining three types of 
exceptions, explicitly and implicitly: religious autonomy exclusion, hybrid rights claims, and 
individualized assessment. The validity of these exceptions was controversial among commentators 
because they were explained in dicta. 
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(2) Exceptions  
a. Religious autonomy exclusion: Hosanna-Tabor  
The Court in Smith discerned the physical act from “lend[ing] its power to one or the other side in 
controversies over religious authority or dogma.,”183 which falls into the religious autonomy area. This 
means that if the law interferes with the internal decision of religious autonomy, then this is not a case 
where the Smith rule should be applied. 
 Recently, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission184 reaffirmed this principle as a ministerial exception. The Hosanna-Tabor Church and 
School fired its employees after the employee suffered from and was treated for narcolepsy. She was a 
minister, as well as a teacher. She filed her case, and the government agency decided in favor of her.185 
However, the Court declared that it was unconstitutional because the ministerial exception gives the 
religious institution certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the 
government186 even if its decision to fire was related to discrimination of a protected class. The Court 
clarified that the religious group has the right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointment 
under the free exercise clause, and the establishment clause prohibited government involvement in the 
church’s decisions.187 Furthermore, the Court did not apply the Smith rule even though the law was 
neutral and generally applicable188 because the religious organization can be exempted absolutely.189 
In Masterpiece, the Court also recognized the exclusion that a member of the clergy, such as priests, 
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should not be compelled to participate in same-sexual wedding rituals opposing their religious doctrine.190 
However, the Court implied that this autonomous exclusion could not be applied to the public 
accommodations, by differentiating this religious exemption entitled to the religious organization and its 
constituents, from the religious exemption claimed by the business entity.   
b. Hybrid rights claim: like Yoder   
The Court in Smith stated that if the claim is related to religious expression, this can fall into the class 
of a “hybrid situation” where “the free exercise clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech,” can “bar application of a neutral, generally applicable law.”191 In 
other words, religious objectors may use their free exercise claims to reinforce their other protected 
rights.192  
For example, in Yoder, Wisconsin required that all children should attend public schools until age 
sixteen. However, Amish parents refused to send their children to those schools after the eighth grade, 
insisting that their religious convictions prevented them from requiring a high school education for their 
children. So, they were prosecuted under state law. The Court stated this public education requirement is 
“in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion.”193 This Court 
upheld the Amish parents’ religious rights and educational rights for their children.  
In Smith, the Court explained this hybrid rights exception explicitly, but it was not applied to the 
case.194 So, after this decision, some lower courts resisted accepting this exception as an existing doctrine 
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because it was dictum in Smith so that it was not binding.195 However, the Court did not explicitly 
overrule the case of this hybrid claim.196 
However, there was another issue as to the meaning of conjunction. There are two possible 
interpretations. One is supplement theory that free exercise claims are potential where the other claims are 
successful. If so, the free exercise claim could be assessed as a supplement of others or “surplusage” in a 
meaningless or declaratory way.197 In other words, it did not give many implications for the free exercise 
claims, other than they “also have religious significance.” Usefully, the other side can argue a 
combination theory that, when another incomplete constitutional claim accompanies a failed free exercise 
one, this combination can carry out one complete and independent claim. If so, the hybrid exception 
“would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”198 However, this theory would be difficult to 
apply to the case if it could not answer how the two rights could be combined, and what minimum 
requirements this incomplete coalition should contain. So, it has been unsettled, even though it was not 
overruled.  
 
195 Some Circuit Courts, including Second, Third, and Sixth Circuit, did not apply this doctrine due to dicta(See, 
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Therefore, the hybrid right claim could be used under the supplement theory, so that the religious 
exemption theory would be useless or redundant.199   
c. The Most Controversial Issue: the Sherbert/Lukumi Test 
The most controversial issue was whether the Smith Court overruled the Sherbert test. Before Smith, 
the operative rule was the Sherbert test. In Sherbert, a religious believer of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church was fired because she declined to work on Saturday, which was the Sabbath Day under her belief. 
Since these religious reasons were not justified, she was also denied unemployment compensation 
benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act because this did not give eligibility 
for benefits of unemployment compensation to those who did not provide good cause for his or her 
unemployment.200 If the government imposes a substantial burden on religious practices,201 it should have 
a compelling state interest.202 Applying this Sherbert rule, the Court held that this disqualification would 
be unconstitutional.  
However, the Smith Court turned its position by a new rule of neutrality and general applicability. Even 
if the law was neutral and generally applicable, the Court should use the balancing test when the 
government imposes burdens on religious exercise. Smith declared that there is no exception when the law 
is neutral and generally applicable.203 It is in line with the connotation of equal protection which 
prevented from “deny [ing] persons of [any] classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others 
enjoy.”204 This exemption theory can be called formal or procedural equality for religious exemptions.205   
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However, the Court tried to retain the Sherbert test in a limited situation, such as the unemployment 
compensation areas, as follows:  
“The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized 
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct… [O]ur decisions in the 
unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of 
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of “religious hardship” 
without compelling reason.” [emphasis added]206  
 
 The Smith Court tried to change the meaning of the Sherbert test in order to adhere to, but not to 
overrule, the test as precedent.207 In Smith, the Court transformed the Sherbert test, in that strict scrutiny 
would be applied when the government, which has an “individualized governmental assessment of the 
reasons for the relevant conduct,” refuses to provide this system to the religious believer.208 When the 
state government, which has the discretion to establish “good cause” standards for secular or individual 
exemptions, imposes a “religious hardship” on religious believers by refusing to extend that system to 
their cases,209 “the law [could be] tainted by a discretionary process and therefore, [would] not [be] 
generally applicable.”210  
   However, the meaning of the Sherbert test that the Smith Court read differs from the original one. In 
the pre-Smith era, this test means that the government gave the religious objectors a case-by-case 
judgment. This infers substantive equality, substantive-equal treatment. However, the transformed 
Sherbert test in Smith211 means that the government allowed the religious objectors to have an 
individualized assessment. So, it infers procedural equality, procedural-equal treatment. The Court did not 
explicitly overrule the Sherbert test, but in this context, the Court thoroughly changed its position towards 
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religious exemptions.  
The Court’s changed position results in the abandonment of the Sherbert test as a substantive-equal 
treatment. Even if this was not the case, the effectiveness of the transformed Sherbert test was 
controversial. First, the Court explained the Sherbert test in dicta, which was nonbinding. Second, it 
virtually seemed to be difficult for courts to apply the Sherbert test212 because the Court did not give any 
specific directions as to when the Smith rule could be excluded other than when the government targets 
religion.    
   This situation changed in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.213 In this case, the Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced based on Santeria, the Afro-Caribbean religion, whose worship included a 
ritual of animal sacrifice.214 After approvals to establish a church, the city council adopted the ordinance, 
which banned animal sacrifice with special exceptions for state-licensed activities.215 The Court held that 
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and it did not 
satisfy strict scrutiny.216  
The Court instructed on two points. One is that the city ordinance was not neutral because it targeted 
religious practices, and it was proven through the ordinances’ text and operation217 by gerrymandering of 
exemptions.218 The other is that it was not generally applicable because prohibition to achieve the 
government interests of preventing cruelty to animals and protecting public health applied only to certain 
religious rituals without any explanations so that it was underinclusive.219 Lawmakers’ discriminatory 
 
212 Actually, there are no cases where the courts applied this test before Lukumi. (Laycock, supra note 180, at 178).  
213 Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)  
214 Id. at 524-25.   
215 Id. at 526-28.  
216 Id. at 546.  
217 “this religious exercise has been targeted is evidenced by Resolution 87-66's statements of "concern" and 
"commitment," and by the use of the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" in Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71.” 
218 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542 (“ordinances' various prohibitions, definitions, and exemptions demonstrate that they 
were "gerrymandered" with care to proscribe religious killings of animals by Santeria church members but to 
exclude almost all other animal killings.”)  
219 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542-546 (“it was drafted with care to forbid few animal killings but those occasioned by 






statements proved especially hostile towards religion.220 Therefore, strict scrutiny should be applied.221 
However, the rule that targeted religious conduct for disparate treatment could not satisfy this scrutiny.222 
The first reasoning of neutrality did not differ from Smith’s. In Smith, the Court reasoned that the law 
of general applicability should be challenged when the government targets religious practices. By similar 
reasoning, the Court in Lukumi proved that the ordinance targeted particular religious practices and finally 
declared that the free exercise clause prohibits “subtle departures from neutrality.”223  
It was clear that the ordinance was aimed at suppressing specific religious practices. Cases like Lukumi, 
which showed discriminatory intent towards religion, were rare. Even with these facts, it could be 
sufficiently proven that they were not neutral, which allowed the Lukumi Court to strike down the 
ordinance. However, the Court went further and added another reasoning for evaluating general 
applicability. Given that there were no cases in lower courts that religious claims were reviewed after 
Smith,224 this had a significant impact on the lower court. According to this Lukumi’s reasoning that one 
or more secular exceptions can show that the law is not generally applicable, the lower courts tried to 
consider the religious exemption claims carefully.225 
Lukumi’s reading of the Sherbert test was the same as the Smith decision.226 The state law, which 
punished anyone who killed any animal unnecessarily, was seemingly neutral and generally applicable on 
 
approved by express provision and that these ordinances are also substantially underinclusive with regard to the 
city's public health interests in preventing the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places and the 
consumption of uninspected meat, since neither interest is pursued by respondent with regard to conduct that is not 
motivated by religious conviction.”)  
220 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540-42.  
221 Id. at 531-532; Furthermore, the Court added that neutrality and general applicability were interrelated, so that 
one failure would likely indicate that the other had not been satisfied. 
222 “A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only 
against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” (Id. at 546).  
223 Id. at 2227 (Citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).  
224 Laycock, supra note 180, at 178 (“Between Smith and Lukumi, lower courts gave no weight to Smith’s 
limitations and exceptions.”) 
225 According to Professor Laycock’s investigation, there are nine or more decisions following this reasoning. See, 
Id. at 180 n.60. 





its face.227 However, the law allowed exceptions under the discretion of officials to decide which animal 
killings were necessary. This is the individualized assessment system for exemptions. In other words, the 
Court considered this exception as a permission process related to “circumstances in which individualized 
exemptions from a general requirement are available.”228 Therefore, the Smith and Lukumi Court changed 
the understanding of the Sherbert test from substantive equality to procedural equality, which means 
equality of opportunity to use the system. The Court instructed that, when the legislature provides the 
individualized assessments for secular reasons to ordinary people, the religious objectors can also use 
those systems.  
Otherwise, the Lukumi decision read by some lower courts further broadly distorted the Sherbert test. 
The courts held that when there were one or more secular exceptions, the state should allow an exception 
for religious objectors,229 even though the government did not have hostility toward religion. According to 
Judge Alito, who later became a Justice in the Supreme Court, it was unconstitutional because the 
government “[t]reat[s] religious interests as less important than the analogous secular interests that are 
exempted.”230 When government action creates exemptions for secular reasons but not for religious 
reasons, this would be unequal treatment between secular and religious practices. Thus, this “actually 
creates a categorical exemption.”231 Therefore, the courts could exempt religious objections according to a 
categorical exemption for secular reasons, created by cases previously determined by the administrative 
agency, even though the government did not have an individualized assessment system for exemption in 
its legislation.  
However, in order to read like the decisions of the lower courts, it is necessary to solve the preliminary 
 
227 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.  
228 Id.   
229 Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 164 
(2017-2018); See, e.g. Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J. holding that the government 
should allow Muslim police officers to wear beards for religious reasons, when the other officer permitted an 
exception for medical reasons.)  
230 Berg, supra note 229, at 165.  





question: why religious and conscience exemptions can be understood as similarly situated to other 
reasons, or in other words, why religious exemptions are in the same categorical exemption as other 
secular reasons. For example,232 it should be proven why this religious exemption should be included in 
the same category of medical exemption before determining that what is less protected should be 
determined as a matter of degree. The similarity between religious exemption and the medical exemption 
was only that both requested an exemption to the rule. By relying only on this fact, it would be difficult to 
view it as being in the same category. Needing an additional rationale for these categorical exemptions. 
Furthermore, it should be understood that this reading differs from the procedural-equality treatment 
pursued by Smith or Lukumi because the procedural-equal treatment means the provision of an equal 
opportunity to assess the exemption system by the same officials while the categorical-equal treatment 
requires only an equal outcome.  
 
In sum, the Court has shifted its stance of religious exemptions from the Sherbert test to the Smith rule, 
or, in other words, from substantive-equal treatment to procedural-equal treatment. When the rule is 
generally appliable, religious practices could not be exempted under the Smith rule. However, if there 
exists an individualized assessment system for secular exemptions, the government should apply this 
system to a religious exemption under the modified Sherbert test in Smith dicta. These two principles, 
linked to each other, could be reduced to the procedural-equal treatment. Other than this exemption issue, 
the Court independently has recognized the area of autonomous exception for the teaching of religious 
doctrine and operation of the religious institution, and also arguably hybrid rights claims exemptions.  
 
3. CHALLENGES TO THE SMITH RULE  
 
232 Id, at 364-66. (deciding that the internal order of the police department that the police should be shaved violated 





Conservative commentators and religious groups have argued that it was not “embedded in the law” 
because the rule of general applicability was not adequately analyzed,233 even though the Court explicitly 
declared the Smith rule. Legislative bodies have been challenging at the federal and state levels, urged by 
conservatives and religious groups. However, such state legislations were also problematic because they 
were far from representing a judicial interpretation. So, commentators have suggested that to solve the 
interconnected problems would be returning to pre-Smith.  
(1) Legislative and Litigant Challenges through the RFRA Movement  
After Smith, many criticisms were raised in a pervasive area such as the academy, religious groups, and 
political groups.234 It created nonpartisan cooperation toward the restoration of religious freedom.235 It 
resulted in Congress’s enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. However, in City of 
Boerne v. Flores,236 the Court held that RFRA, which intended to restore the Sherbert test, was 
unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress had exceeded its constitutional power when it 
sought to apply RFRA against state governments.237 
In City of Boerne, the city authorities tried to expand their powers to the church located in a historic 
preservation district by an ordinance banning new construction. So, the Archbishop of San Antonio 
argued that this expansion violated the RFRA, which protects religious exemptions through the Sherbert 
test. The Court struck down the RFRA because the RFRA seemed to be “an attempt to invoke substantive 
change in constitutional protection.” Congress has no authority to create new rights by legislation, so it 
may not interfere with each state’s general authorities to regulate for the health and welfare of their 
 
233 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 38, at 35; Conkle, supra note 29, at 24-27.   
234 For example, “The Court’s decision in Smith generated a significant amount of public consternation.” “one legal 
commentator recalls, “God may not have died in 1990, but from the uproar in the legal community that year, His 
chances of survival in the American polity appeared rather slim,” “A large and bipartisan coalition quickly formed 
to push Congress to pass legislation that would better protect Americans’ religious freedom.” (Paul Baumgardner & 
Brian K. Miller, Moving from the Statehouses to the State Courts: The Post-RFRA Future of State Religious 
Freedom Protections, 82 ALB. L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2018)) 
235 Id.at 1392 (citing Martina E. Cartwright, Book, Chapter and Verse: The Rise and Rise of the Freedom of 
Conscience Movement Post-Windsor and Obergefell, 23 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 39, 60-61, 61 n.185 (2016).) 
236 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).  





citizens,238 including determining the substance of religious exemptions. Congress could exercise its 
legislative authorities under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy or prevent the rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.239 
This does not mean that religious exemptions are not a right guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. 
The implication of City of Boerne was not that the Free Exercise Clause did not guarantee religious 
freedom, but that Congress should not create new rights or revise fundamental rights beyond the Court’s 
interpretation by legislation. Congress did not discuss the validity of the Smith rule the Court established, 
but it provided provisions that contradicted the rule. It is an intrusion of the judicial authorities of 
interpretation established in Marbury v. Madison240 when Congress tried to change the Court’s 
interpretation. 
It led Congress to “determine [how] states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions.” So, it 
was unconstitutional that Congress made the RFRA without any limitations established through the 
Court’s precedent,241 such as the Smith rule. As a result, Congress enacted RLUIPA, which regulates 
religious institutions and their places, but still, did not follow the instructions of City of Boerne.242   
Therefore, this holding did not resolve the disputes: whether religious exemptions should be allowed 
under the Free Exercise Clause, and if possible, how to do so, because it was not related to the 
interpretation of religious exemptions under the free exercise, while it delivered the holding related to the 
authorities of Congress. However, most courts and commentators read this decision as meaning that the 
Court viewed religious exemptions as not protected under the Free Exercise Clause. This interpretation is 
correct from the point of view that the Smith rule was established under the Constitution. However, from 
 
238Id. at 534.  
239 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 
240 “When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which 
embraces the duty to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 173, 177 (1803). 
241 Justice Stevens added that RFRA violated the Free Exercise Clause because it preferred certain religious 
practices (City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-544 (Stevens, J., concurring)).  
242 Steve Sanders, RFRAs and Reasonableness, 91 Ind. L.J. 243, 253 (2016) (RFRAs and RLUIPA gave privilege to 





the perspective that the Smith rule was unsettled, it is not.  
It reignited the legislation movement of RFRA at the state level so that the states with RFRA expanded 
to nineteen states in 2015.243 This exemption argument under federal and state RFRAs made for political 
debates such as a pro-life argument and the opposition of same-sex marriage, as well as unusual religious 
exercises. Notably, after Obergefell v. Hodge, which recognized same-sex marriage as a fundamental 
right, 11 states have drafted RFRA legislation as opposing this decision in 2015 alone, and two states 
would succeed in the enactment of mini-RFRAs.244 They also have issues raised in City of Boerne.    
Furthermore, under the Smith rule, there are no explanations of why the hybrid claim exemption and 
the religious autonomous practices exemption can be allowed when the law is generally applicable and 
why this should distinguish Sherbert exemptions from other exemption claims.  
As such, the movement aroused conflict between the legislature and judiciary, between conservatives 
and progressives, between religious groups and LGBTQ supporters, so that it brought fragmentation 
within civil society.  
 (2) Returning to Pre-Smith  
Due to these legislative challenges and interpretive challenges, several conservative commentators 
have insisted on returning to the pre-Smith test, which means the original Sherbert test. As previously 
stated, the Court did not overrule the Smith rule but implied that the Sherbert test could be applied to the 
religious exemption cases. So there have been controversies over the judicial interpretation of religious 
 
243 Jonathan Griffin, Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL Vol. 23, No. 17 (May 2015)  
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/religious-freedom-restoration-acts-lb.aspx ); Frank S. 
Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish for: Why Hobby Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2016 BYU L. REV. 55, 59, 
85.; Baumgardner & Miller, supra note 234, at 1393.  
244 Id. at 1393; explaining Kansas’s failure to enact RFRA, Cartwright, supra note 235, at 61; Ed Pilkington, Kansas 
Republican Leaders Get Cold Feet Over 'Anti-Gay'Bill, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/14/kansas-republican-lawmakers-criticise-anti-gay-marriage-bill ; 







exemptions. As well, after Smith, the legislative bodies enacted Federal and Mini-RFRAs for restoring the 
Sherbert test. As was pointed out in City of Boerne, the issue was controversial because those legislations 
did not accept the constitutional interpretation, such as the Smith rule, concerning religious exemptions.  
Secondly, it will raise, as Professor Lund stated, “constitutional luck.”   Where the state has exceptions 
on its legislation or adjudication, a person who practices his or her religious beliefs can be protected, but 
“only because the government happens to have protected someone else.”245 So, returning to the pre-Smith 
era would remove the element of this luck. 
Therefore, several commentators have insisted that it was better to return to a customized assessment, 
which means the Sherbert test in the pre-Smith era. Several commentators believe that the transformed 
Sherbert test will apply only on rare occasions,246 so it could not protect religious people. Supporters of 
the former argument of the original Sherbert test insist that exemptions are not an unfair privilege but 
historically that they have been granted to religion.247  Furthermore, state-RFRAs may cause unfettered 
religious accommodations against City of Boerne so that they may give religious objectors impermissible 
exemptions as a privilege.248 So, they argued that the Court should go back to the pre-Smith rule.  
However, there are several concerns about returning to pre-Smith, the original Sherbert test. First, it 
could bring a floodgate of religious exemptions to the courts. Furthermore, it “will open the door to 
serious disagreements among the lower courts over when and under what circumstances business owners 
can refuse to serve same-sex couples.”249  
 
245 Lund, supra note 197, at 644.   
246 Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal 
Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL., 119, 194 (2002); Duncan demonstrated “how [the transformed Sherbert test] can be used 
to protect religious liberty in a wide variety of cases.” (Duncan, supra note 207, at 1190-98).   
247 Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits, 106 
KY. L.J. 717, 724-727 (2017). 
248 Thus, Professor Sanders urged, “‘Reasonableness’ for religious liberty stakeholders, then, means refraining from 
abusing the privilege that religious accommodations provide, and not exploiting the fact courts are likely to accept 
most claims about religious belief at face value.” (Sanders, supra note 242, at 253).  
249 Ariane de Vogue & Eli Watkins, Supreme Court Won’t Take Up Case of Florist Who Refused Service for Same-






Second, this can cause the misunderstanding that privileges are given to religious practices. Religious 
exemptions can operate, in effect, as an absolute right if the governmental actions influencing religious 
conduct should satisfy strict scrutiny. This is because heightened scrutiny will make religious objectors 
succeed. After all, it is hard to meet this standard. Several previous decisions demonstrated this 
proposition. For example, the Court in Yoder balanced an Amish exemption against the state’s 
“paramount” interests of education.250  
Furthermore, the Court in Gonzales provided a sincere religious exercise for church members drinking 
the hoasca CSA(CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT)251 prohibited prevail to the three governmental interests 
was denied, protecting the church members’ health and safety, and preventing the public from using it for 
recreation and complying with a 1971 UN convention on Psychotopic Substances.252 As far as Smith is 
concerned, protecting “religious divergence” might prevail over government interests unless the 
regulation promotes “an interest of the highest order.”253 In Hobby Lobby, the government did not meet 
strict scrutiny even though the third-party’s interest was a compelling governmental interest. The Court 
held that the government did not find out the least restrictive means. 254   
However, the supporters insist that these concerns can be removed, given facts that courts in the pre-
Smith era have admitted the Sherbert test to a strictly limited area, such as unemployment compensation. 
Furthermore, when the compelling government interests are about eradicating discrimination in public 
 
flowers/index.html. This article was written in favor of LGBTQ’s rights.; Supreme Court won’t hear case of florist 
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250 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213, 221.  
251 21 U.S.C. ch. 13 § 801 et seq. 
252 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432-438 (2006).  
253 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888; The Court’s concern was that “[t]he rule respondents favor would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind -- ranging 
from, compulsory military service, see, e. g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), to the payment of 
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254 In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority, stated that “[a]mong the reasons the United States 
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accommodations, the Court would not always give priority to religious exemptions. Even though federal 
RFRA and mini-RFRAs reflect the original Sherbert test, decisions of federal lower courts and state 
courts under the RFRAs were not consistent. Moreover, some scholars support that anti-discrimination 
interests could be compelling interests to interfere with religious exemptions even though the Court 
would restore the pre-Smith balancing test.255 Therefore, to secure heightened scrutiny is a reliable 
protection for religious freedom, but it is not absolute. 
According to precedents, there are two kinds of limitations under the First Amendment. From United 
States v. Lee,256 religious exemptions should not violate the third-party’s free exercise. The Court decided 
that “accommodations violate the First Amendment if they coerce third-parties to participate in practices 
that they do not share.”257 From Estate of Thornton v Caldor,258 the Court held that “religious 
accommodations are impermissible when they force third-parties to affirm faiths that are not their own” 
under the Establishment Clause.259 Furthermore, even with a return to the pre-Smith test, it is unclear that 
the religious exemption argument would prevail over the third party interests, LGBTQ’s rights, which 
public accommodations law tries to protect by eradicating discrimination. 
Therefore, Masterpiece was expected to accomplish two things: first is whether the Court would return 
to the existing position on the religious exemption, procedural-equal treatment, to pre-Smith, substantive-
equal treatment, and second is what will result from the balancing test with a third party if strict scrutiny 
 
255 Professor Conkle argued, "preventing discrimination provides a compelling justification that overrides wedding 
vendors' free exercise rights.” (Conkle, supra note 29, at 27-30)  
256 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (deciding that when an Amish employer rejected to pay social security 
taxes based on his religious beliefs, it was unconstitutional under the free exercise clause was unconstitutional 
because “[g]ranting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's 
religious faith on the employees.”[emphasis added])  
257 Following this decision, see, Brush & Nib Studios, 418 P. 3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018); Telescope Media. 936 F. 
3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019); Fulton v. City of Phila. 922 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2019) 
258 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 US 703 (1985) (deciding that when the law prohibited an employer’s 
declination of an employee who rejected to work on his Sabbath, this statute is unconstitutional under the 
establishment clause because it provided “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other 
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IV. MASTERPIECE’S EQUAL TREATMENT UNDER THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE 
In Masterpiece, therefore, theoretically, the critical issue was to determine whether the religious 
exemption could be allowed, and determine whether the governmental interests in protecting the third-
parties by eradicating discrimination would prevail in terms of religious freedom if the exemption could 
be allowed. In other words, the Court should have decided whether to go back to the Sherbert test prior to 
the Smith decision and also should have determined whether to accept the Sherbert test revised in Smith’s 
dicta if the Court would adhere to the Smith rule.  
Phillips’ argument was “the Commission’s order unconstitutionally infringes on its right to the free 
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”260 Phillips argued that, due to different 
treatment between Phillips and the three bakers who refused to create the cake with “religious messages 
opposing same-sex marriage,” “the Commission has contravened the Free Exercise Clause’s neutrality 
and general-applicability requirements.”261  
On the institutional level, the Court could apply the Smith rule to this CADA in Masterpiece. This rule 
means that the legislation should not be challenged by religious objections when it is generally applicable. 
To avoid this rule, the baker should invoke the claims under the mini-RFRA, which the state enacts. 
Otherwise, the baker should repugn the general applicability and argue religious exemptions. However, 
Colorado did not have any type of RFRA, and CADA did not allow any exceptions for declination to 
provide goods and services to protected classes.262 So, Phillips needed to directly trigger regulations of 
 
260 Mullins, 370 P.3d at 288.  
261 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 23 Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) 
(No. 16-111); See Brief of Christian Legal Society, at 18-29, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Furthermore, “Phillips’s most powerful argument … was that the 
same anti-animus principle that protects gays and lesbians must be applied with equal force to protect religious 
minorities.”(Id. at 41-46) (Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
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CADA or the Commission’s application by invoking the First Amendment on the federal constitutional 
level.263 In this case, the Free Exercise claims can apply to the state through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.264 
In conclusion, the Court held that the Civil Rights Commission compromised their duty of neutrality 
toward religion so that it violated the free exercise right of Phillips, the baker. The majority decided that 
the Commission’s adjudication was not satisfied to implement the “neutral and respectful consideration” 
due by showing hostility towards religion through disparate treatment between conscientious-based 
refusal and religious-based refusal and discriminatory statements. Seven Justices agreed that the 
Commission had hostility toward religion according to official demeaning statements, while five Justices 
accepted that the Commission treated this religious objection case of Phillips differently from secular 
refusal cases. However, this violation was only related to the state agency, but not the state legislature. 
The Court ensured the Smith rule in determining that CADA was neutral and generally applicable so that 
it did not allow for the religious exemptions.  
The Court's reasoning showed two significant meanings for the lower courts. One was that the Court 
confirmed the Smith rule in the public accommodation law, and the other was that the determination of 
whether the state agency which deals with particular cases has fulfilled its neutral obligation toward 
religion could be made separately even if the applicable law is neutral.  
Following this Court’s decision, the lower courts, in subsequent cases, determined their cases in these 
two ways. On the one hand, the courts ensured that the state public accommodation law was neutral so 
that the Smith rule should be applied as long as the regulations would not target religious beliefs or 
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264 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 (In view of the result we have 
reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to 
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practices.265 Therefore, ordinary religious exercise claims,266 such as that “their religion requires them to 
engage in conduct that the government forbids267 or it forbids certain conduct that the government 
requires,”268 could not be reviewed under the neutral and generally applicable law. On the other hand, the 
subsequent courts reviewed the agency-related issues independently on whether the action of state 
agencies were neutral toward religion when the state agency dealt with the case. Even though the Court 
gave two elements, disrespectful remarks of officials and disparate treatment, to point hostility towards 
religion, among the subsequent lower courts cases, there were no cases to determine that the state agency 
compromised its duty of neutrality according to these two elements.  
This chapter discusses the Masterpiece’s reasons more carefully and argues that this Court recognized 
the procedural-equal treatment into which the Smith Court transformed the Sherbert test.   
 
1. MASTERPIECE’S REASONS   
The Masterpiece Court determined that the official should have a neutral and respectful consideration 
towards religion relying on Lukumi as sole precedent. Lukumi held that “the government [] cannot impose 
regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs [] and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon 
or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”269 Furthermore, the hostility towards 
religion can be proven through “[f]actors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality”270 It 
contained that “the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events 
leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, 
 
265 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79; Lukumi 508 U.S. at 531.  
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267 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (Evaluating whether those who practice Santeria could perform an animal sacrifice, 
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including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.” 271 
Masterpiece dealt with two governmental bodies, legislative and adjudicatory. 272 The Court did not 
find out any flaws in the legislative, such as hostility or animus. If there had been any hostility toward 
religion in the democratic process of CADA, the Court would have accepted the animus doctrine from 
Lukumi. Thus, this would have resulted in a lack of compelling government interest. However, the Court 
did not apply Lukumi to the legislature. Furthermore, it repeatedly showed that the Court followed the 
Smith rule, that generally applicable law should not be challenged by religious objections.273 
In contrast, the Court targeted the adjudicatory body, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Before 
Masterpiece, the Court discussed only the legislation issues, even though the matter was related to the 
acts of an administrative agency.274 While Lukumi dealt with the legislature’s activities, the Court 
expanded Lukumi to adjudication and built out a new rule for them that officials in adjudicatory agencies 
should have “neutral and respectful consideration” toward religious believers. Applying this rule to the 
case, the Court held that the Commission violated this duty by showing that “a clear and impermissible 
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated [baker’s] objections.”275 Furthermore, 
according to Lukumi, the Court did not use strict scrutiny because there were no compelling interests by 
proving animus of government.276  
The Court in Masterpiece pointed out two elements to prove this. The first, which seven Justices voted 
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for, was that there were several “inappropriate and dismissive comments277 [to] show[] lack of due 
consideration” with no restraint of their statements.278 Three comments made by the two Commissioners 
described Phillips’s religious beliefs as justifying historical discrimination, such as “slavery” or a 
“holocaust.”279 These statements indicated that the official did not have neutrality towards Phillips’ 
beliefs.  
The other, which was supported by five Justices, was about religious “gerrymander[ing]”280 in which 
there was disparate treatment between Phillips’s case and the other cases of “bakers who objected to a 
requested cake based on conscience and prevailed before the Commission.” Christian Jack requested three 
bakers to create a cake with messages, which contained hostile words toward same-sex marriage.281 All 
three bakers refused to make these cakes. The Civil Rights decided that the bakers did not violate the rule 
when they refused services due to the offensiveness of the ordered messages. It could be allowed 
“because each baker was willing to sell other products [to Jack], including those depicting Christian 
themes, to the prospective customers,”282 but they would not have sold the same kind of cake Jack ordered 
from them to any customers. In Masterpiece, Phillip was pleased to sell any other baked cakes and any 
cakes on the shelves, but not the custom cakes for a same-sex wedding. He did not sell those custom 
cakes to any customers, including Mullins’ mother. He did not want to do so because his religious beliefs 
banned this creation. As to his belief, the custom cakes were offensive to him. However, the same 
 
277 There were three statements which the Court considered as inappropriate: 1) on May 30th, 2014, at the public 
hearing, one commissioner’s statement: “what he wants to believe,… if he decides to do business in the state,” he 
cannot act on his religious beliefs.(Tr 23 cited by Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 at 1729) 2) on the same day, a few 
moments later, the same Commissioner’s statement: “if a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got 
an issue with the-the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.”(id.) 
3) on July 25th, 2014, in the meeting, another Commissioner’s statement: “I would also like to reiterate what we said 
in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout 
history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be-I mean, we-we can list hundreds of 
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others.” (Tr. 30 cited by Masterpiece, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 at 1729)  
278 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 at 1729-30.  
279 Id. at 1729. 
280 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534; Kendrick & Schwartman, supra note 261, at 138.  
281 The problematic messages were these: “God hates sin, Psalm 45:7” and “homosexuality is a detestable sin. 
Leviticus 18:22” (Joint Appendix at 232-233; cited in Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1749).   





Division decided that Phillips violated the CADA because “the treatment of the conscientious-based 
objections [of Jack’s requests] contrasts with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ objection.”283 
Furthermore, the other superior bodies such as ALJ(Administrative Law Judge) or the Colorado Court of 
Appeals did not correct this unequal treatment between previous conscientious—based objection cases 
and Phillips’ religious-based objection case. Different treatments among equally situated cases show that 
the state has lost its neutrality towards religious vendors. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that, due to these two factors, the official compromised “neutral and 
respectful consideration” towards religion in the Commission’s decision on Phillips’s case.284285 
 
2. DISPUTES AFTER MASTERPIECE 
The Court clearly expressed that the officials compromised neutral and respectful consideration by 
inferring animus toward religion through two reasons: discriminatory statements by two officials and 
disparate treatment between conscientious and religious refusals.  
The Masterpiece Court used Lukumi as precedent. According to Lukumi, this disparate treatment could 
have been seen as an exception to the Smith rule because the Court reasoned that neutrality and general 
applicability was divided. In Lukumi, the structural underinclusiveness286 could break the Smith rule of 
general applicability, while violation of neutrality proved that the government intended to target religious 
practices through showing the legal text and discriminatory statements during the passage of the 
ordinance. Several lower courts which follow Lukumi as precedent, accepted categorical exemption for 
religious practices if there was one or more secular exemption.  
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284 Id.   
285 Did not get the "benefit of a fair and impartial adjudicatory process" (Alexander, supra note 143, at 1100.  
286 In Lukumi, the city ordinance regulated religious practices to achieve governmental goals, while conduct for 





In Masterpiece, the Colorado Commission had three previous cases to allow the vendors’ refusals for 
conscientious reasons. Thus, for commentators, it was the important issue of whether the Court should 
interpret those cases as categorical exemptions like several lower court decisions following Lukumi.  
(1) Narrow Interpretation to define Masterpiece as fact-specific   
  In terms of narrow interpretation, the two elements, disparate treatment and demeaning remarks were 
fact-specific, so that they have no meaning for the following religious vendors’ cases in public 
accommodations. Generally, the Court does not investigate whether the official’s action independently 
violates neutrality when the law was generally applicable. However, unusually, the Court in Masterpiece 
determined whether each state agency, the legislature, and the administrative, fulfilled the duty of 
neutrality toward religion, and it found anomalies from the Commission, the adjudicatory body, but not 
the state legislature. So, it made the case fact-specific, and its breach could have been sufficiently proven 
only by hostile statements even without disparate treatment.287 In particular, since the public 
accommodation laws do not recognize exceptions in general, it would be difficult to find exemptions for 
the vendor’s refusals, and it would be more challenging to find disparate treatment between religious 
cases and other cases. Thus, it seemed that malicious statements were more essential than disparate 
treatment. 
Furthermore, the commentators who supported a narrow interpretation are skeptical even about the 
reasons by which the Court found a compromise of the neutral and respectful consideration. They pointed 
out two issues. First, they found that the Court misread the facts. They explained that, for instance, as to 
these statements that “what[ever] he wants to believe… if he decides to do business in the state,” he 
cannot act on his religious beliefs,” and “if a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an 
issue with the-the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to 
 
287 The majority opinion considered that each of evil statements or disparate treatment could prove a violation of 
neutrality. However, Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion did not agree with the reason that disparate treatment made 
the government non-neutral, but only agreed with the hostility of the officials’ statements. (Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 





compromise,288 the Commissioner merely relied on the judge’s statement in Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock,289 which, as they stated, was “simply reflect[ion of] the current state of anti-discrimination 
law.”290  Furthermore, this even applied to the most problematic statement that  
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion 
and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be-I means, we-we can list hundreds of situations 
where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. Moreover, it is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to -to use their religion to hurt others291  
This was delivered after the Commission decided to deny Phillips’ claims even though it might be the 
expression of a hostile attitude.292 So, they criticized that it was “manufactured.”293  
Second, even if the state Commission and courts could have found hostility by several Commissioners, 
it would not have overruled the decision of the Commission. Justice Ginsburg stated that even if the 
comments of some Commissioners were biased against religion, several proceedings with superior bodies 
had assured protection for Phillips’ rights due to independent judgment even though the results were the 
same as the Commission’s. It would be difficult to determine other judgments were also tainted with 
animus. Moreover, while the government in Lukumi was a sole body without other related bodies, in 
Masterpiece, there was a judiciary hierarchy that made it possible to revoke or review the lower 
adjudicatory decision. 294   
However, the majority reduced the duty of neutrality to tolerance,295and mandated the agency to have 
 
288 Tr. 23 cited from Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 at 1729.  
289 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) 
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291 Tr. 30 cited from Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
292 Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 261, at 140-41. 
293 Id. at 139.  
294 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1751-52. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)  
295 “Here, that means the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral 
toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”(Id. at 1731) “In view of these factors the record here demonstrates 
that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of Phillips’ religious 
belief.”(Id. at 1731) “… all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without 





“every appearance” of respectfulness with tolerance. 296 Moreover, it invalidated the determination of the 
state agency due to the violation of this duty.  Thus, some commentators accused the Court of distorting 
the mere “etiquette” issue as a “reasonable justification.”297 
Therefore, it seems that when the Court suggested hatred statements as the only element, this would be 
insufficient to prove animosity toward religion. However, this insufficiency does not mean that the Court 
should completely abandon the animus doctrine. Instead, more objective evidence is needed to prove it.  
(2) Attempt to Broaden reading and Returning to the Pre-Smith Era 
As to commentators, who interpreted Masterpiece’s holding broadly with its dicta, they focus on 
different treatment between conscientious refusals by three bakers in the cases of Jack and religious 
refusals in the case of Phillips. From this perspective, Masterpiece could be interpreted to uphold the 
Sherbert/Lukumi test, because the three previous cases of Jack established the categorical exemptions for 
secular reasons.298 The majority held that the determinations of the Commission did not rely on “a 
principled rationale for” different treatment in these two instant cases.299 As to the attribution issue, the 
Commission accepted that the messages of the requested wedding cake “would be attributed to the 
customer” in Phillips’ case, while the cases in Jack did not mention this element. As to the alternative 
provision issue, the willingness to sell other goods was considered in Jack’s case but not in Phillips’ 
case.300 This inconsistency continued to the state courts’ decisions.301 Furthermore, it would indicate the 
hostility toward religion at the state level.302  
Therefore, the commentators suggested that the Court provide a clue to return to pre-Smith to protect 
these politically unpopular religious groups, because Masterpiece proved that the state government would 
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have hostility toward religion.303 They insisted on a substantive-equal treatment toward religious 
exemptions.       
  In opposition to using the animus doctrine for religious vendors in public accommodations, several 
commentators criticized those arguments as “inverting animus.”304 They were concerned that recently, a 
challenge toward anti-discrimination had increased not by minorities but by majorities, who sometimes 
might have had a discriminatory attitude toward minorities, whom anti-discrimination law should protect, 
like the “reverse racism” claims against affirmative action.305 They considered that Lukumi was 
misleading in Masterpiece. He pointed out that there is a big difference between the Santeria in Lukumi 
and the conservative Christian, Phillips. The former is “a minority religion practiced by racial and ethnic 
minorities,” but the latter is a majority religion whose believer is “prominently white and free to express 
their faiths openly.” The animus doctrine should be used for “reform[ing] the systems in which have made 
the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups” 306  like Romer and Windsor. In other words, 
it should be used to break down “the broader social and political context that suggested resistance to, if 
not hostility toward, same-sex couples and their relationships,”307 which have oppressed gays’ lives 
through institutions and practices.308  
 
One might be skeptical that Masterpiece did not accept this restoration argument, but rather adhered to 
 
303 Id, at 167.  
304 Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257 
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308 Professor Sager and Professor Tebbe also focus on the reality citing Charles Black’s desegregation. (Larry Sager 
& Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 (2019)) (Applying a “reality principle,” 
Black made legally relevant the social fact that segregation worked to perpetuate white supremacy. We argue that 
similar attention to the social structure of antidiscrimination laws excludes the errant interpretation of Masterpiece); 
Laycock, supra note 180, at 167. (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421 (1960) (“African-Americans’ right to equal treatment trumped any alleged white right not to 
associate, because there was no equivalence between the white and black populations in the American South in the 





the Smith rule. Furthermore, a substantive-equal treatment cannot secure the religious exemptions under 
the balancing tests even though it would have reversed the Smith rule. The Masterpiece Court suggested 
that the governmental interest for eradicating discrimination would prevail under the third-party harm 
principle. In Masterpiece, the Court declared the principle related to the third-party harm as follows,  
[W]hile those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such 
objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and society to deny 
protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable 
public accommodations law. 
 
Citing Piggie Park, the Masterpiece Court did not allow for a refusal to provide goods and services to 
protected classes for fair and full enjoyment, at least in public accommodations. According to this dicta, 
the Court would likely decide that the protection of the third parties by eradicating discrimination would 
prevail when vendors claimed their religious exemptions under the RFRA. To be sure, the Court did not 
clearly express yet how much harm to third parties will materialize, or in other words, on what standard, 
by what elements, and to what degree the harm should be specified. Thus, these questions should be 
defined in future cases, but this uncertainty would not make the Court recognize religious exemption.  
It is true that recently the influence of religious people on society has been weakened.309 For this reason, 
however, it is difficult to apply the animus doctrine to assure religious exemptions because its purpose is 
to realize equality for those who are not politically influential and so cannot prevail on the democratic 
process through substantive equality.  
Therefore, the narrow interpretation overlooked the importance of disparate treatment while the broad 
interpretation exaggerated and distorted the Sherbert test according to the lower courts which interpreted 
the Lukumi decision.   
(3) Procedural-Equal Treatment: Equal Opportunity for the Use of Individualized Assessment 
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Here, this thesis reviewed that the Supreme Court's attitude toward religious exemption was procedural-
equal treatment. As discussed above, the narrow interpretation and the broad interpretation of the 
Masterpiece decision could not draw conclusions consistent with the procedural-equal treatment pursued 
by the Court after Smith.  
The split opinions in the Masterpiece Court were about the doctrinal baseline issue on how to view the 
vendor’s refusal as harmful or not.310 The majority believe that the conclusions may differ depending on 
the following baseline questions. For example: “[i]f a baker refused to design a special cake with words or 
images celebrating the marriage” 311; or if “[a] baker’s refus[ed] to attend the wedding to ensure that the 
cake is cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the case, or even a 
refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or 
symbols on it.”312 These refusals might have been “different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.”313 
However, these questions did not give any guidance to the lower courts when they confronted similar 
cases to solve the conflict between these two values, but rather, they seemed to pass on the responsibility.  
It was not clear for the Court to determine whether the disparate treatment among secular and religious 
exemptions was related to the Sherbert test. No matter what the answer is, if the vendor's refusal is 
discriminatory, the courts would conclude that public accommodations law may not allow exemption 
according to the Smith rule. In the case of discriminatory refusal, the conclusion is right. However, one 
more thing needs to be considered: the public accommodation law may allow a permissible rejection 
depending on the purpose of the public accommodation law, full and equal enjoyment. In other words, 
 
310 In determining whether there is harm in Hobby Lobby, there is a controversial debate over how to draw the 
baseline. If the inclusion of contraceptive payments is a baseline in the revised law, religious exemption is a 
deprivation of benefits of employees. However, if not before the revision, the baseline is not included in those 
benefits, and the religious exemptions impose a zero effect on employees. (Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. 
Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's Puzzling Footnote 3, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 323, 336 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Brady, supra note 247, at 722.). Likewise, in public 
accommodations, relying on the baseline, the Court could determine what is harmful or not. The Masterpiece Court 
had focused on how this can be resolved doctrinally.   
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discriminatory refusals should not be allowed, but there may be permissible rejection under the public 
accommodations law. In particular, the opinion of Justice Kagan, which was related to the vendor’s right 
to choose what to sell, was noteworthy.  
The purpose of the public accommodation law is to guarantee full and equal enjoyment of goods and 
services. This purpose can be replaced by eradicating discrimination against any customers, especially 
against protected traits. Here, the vendors should fulfill their duty to provide equal access to all 
customers. There is no right of the vendor to choose customers in the provision of goods and services. 
However, as Justice Kagan mentioned, the vendor also has the right to make choices about the goods and 
services he will provide.314 The vendor’s declination can be done according to whether goods or services 
are intended to be sold or not. The former is permissible, but the latter is not. In addition, the state agency 
can determine whether the refusal could be allowed. 
The majority dealt with the issue of whether the related state applied the case with consistent and 
principled rationale. The majority considered that discriminatory treatment was not justified because they 
did not apply a consistent standard to the cases between secular and religious exemption, whereas the 
opposing opinions of Justice Kagan and Justice Ginsburg determined that it was justified because they 
were applied consistently. These two opinions showed the opposite results toward each other, but both 
opinions have two things in commons. The first is that the existence of an individualized assessment 
system of determining whether the refusal toward protected classes is permissible, and the second is that 
if the state has a principled standard of such a system, it should be consistently applied.  
All Justices would likely support the first statement because it serves the purpose of public 
accommodations law. The purpose of public accommodation law is to eradicate anti-discrimination in 
public accommodations by assuring full and fair enjoyment of accommodations. Justices reasoned that 
they could allow the vendor’s refusal within this objective. In light of the purpose of the anti-
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discrimination act, full and equal enjoyment means to guarantee all citizens access to public 
accommodations no matter their race, color, religion, or sexual orientation.315  When the vendor intends to 
refuse to provide goods or services based on a trait of protected classes, it is not allowed under the public 
accommodations law. For example, it cannot be denied when the vendor does not want to provide it due 
to particular religious supporters or gays and lesbians. 
However, if the vendors do not compromise the purpose of the full and equal enjoyment and would have 
refused all the customers, this general refusal does not violate public accommodations law. This law 
restricts vendors’ right to choose their customers because it imposes duties to secure their customers’ 
equal access to goods and services on vendors, but it could not force them to decide what products or 
services the vendors will offer.316 Once the vendor has decided to provide or to sell certain products or 
services, the law may restrict the vendor when he or she does not provide them to every customer, 
especially the customers who have protected traits under the public accommodation law. However, the 
law cannot constrain the vendor’s decision of what products or services he or she will provide in the 
market. The vendor could have the right to refuse to provide products which he or she intends not to sell. 
The state agency, or commission, has authorities to determine whether this refusal is permissible, and it is 
the procedural-equal treatment of the Sherbert test, 317 read by Smith and Lukumi, that gives the agency 
the same opportunity for assessment. 
As a religious exemption, the vendor can claim permissible refusals within the right to choose what to 
 
315 See, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S. C. § 2000a. (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, 
… without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”) However, 
twenty-five states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and twenty-one states prohibit discrimination 
based on gender identity while the federal act did not consider sexual orientation or gender as a protected class. 
(State Public Accommodation Laws, NCSL (April 8, 2019) https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx).  
316 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 note * (Kagan, J., concurring) 
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sell, but not discriminatory refusals. It is at the discretion of the agency to decide on the range of product 
options that determine what constitutes an acceptable denial and what constitutes a discriminatory 
objection. However, the opinions of Masterpiece suggest two general requirements to establish this 
general individualized assessment. First, the criteria for determining what product or services is general 
for equal access should be consistent in all cases, and, second, they should be included in the scope of 
product selection. 
As to the first element, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kagan agreed. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the 
general level of cakes was inconsistent when the case was determined in the state government.318 He saw 
the provision of ‘wedding cakes’ as a general level for the duty to provide equal access.319 For example, if 
a baker provides a wedding cake to a heterosexual couple, but not to a gay couple, it violates the law, and 
it is not within the right to choose what to sell.  
However, the opinion of Justice Gorsuch was misleading because it argued that it could be offensive to 
provide the same wedding cakes for same-sex marriages. Justice Gorsuch presumed that the wedding 
cakes for same-sex marriages is different from general wedding cakes. It is a special request to the baker. 
However, as Kagan correctly pointed out,320 there is no distinction between cakes supporting same-sex 
marriage and heterosexual marriage. Furthermore, Justice Gorsuch’s argument cannot be admitted by the 
right of vendors to choose what to sell. He included the purpose of the product within the right of 
vendors, but it was beyond this right because there is no difference between a cake supporting same-sex 
marriage and opposite-sex marriage when choosing products and services.  
From this point of view, Masterpiece's baker cannot be saved through religious exemptions because he 
intended not to provide his custom cake for same-sex marriages that did not fall within the scope of the 
right of vendors. Therefore, the views of Judge Kagan and Judge Ginsburg seem to be justified in this 
 
318 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)  
319 Id.  





regard. They classified the two events as follows. According to Justice Kagan, “the three bakers in the 
Jack cases did not violate [anti-discrimination] law… [because] [i]n refusing that request, the bakers did 
not single out Jack because of his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they would have 
treated anyone else-just as CADA requires.”321  The opinion of Justice Ginsburg had the same reasoning. 
The baker, Phillips, would not sell to Craig and Mullins a cake “he would provide to a heterosexual 
couple”322 for no reason other than discrimination based on sexual orientation. In contrast, the other three 
bakers treat the religious believer, who requested religious words with a demeaning image, equally “as 
any other customer would have been treated – no better, no worse.”323  
These views allowed rejection if the requested message was offensive to the baker. This was categorized 
as a refusal to give to all customers, which is a permissible refusal. If the vendor is subjectively displeased 
with the ordered message, so that the vendor cannot provide this product to any customers, the vendor can 
reject it. At this time, the offensiveness cannot be determined objectively by the government. 
Offensiveness can be seen as an example of a reason for permissible rejections.  
The preposition to apply this assessment requires good faith interpretations of refusals. This theory does 
not mean that all declinations of vendors toward customers implicitly grounded on the discriminatory 
minds, should be allowed or justified. These declinations should not even be considered because they 
must be viewed as violations of the spirit and purpose of the public accommodation laws. However, the 
refusal of personally offensive messages against their religious convictions may be allowed, only when 
they do not violate the full and fair enjoyment by rejecting certain groups protected by the public 
accommodation law. This is because the official cannot judge what offensiveness is and because the 
vendors should be treated equally as a citizen. In good faith, most of the religious believers might have 
the willingness to provide other goods or services to all customers other than what their religious 
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convictions do not allow them to provide. What should be emphasized here is that while religious 
oppositions cannot challenge the Smith rule that all citizens equally should follow, at least they have equal 
rights to use an assessment system that can be recognized as a legitimate refusal by the government. 
Some may rebut relying on the official’s duty of civility to citizens that he or she should give reasons to 
the religious people.324 They might be right. What is important here is not that the results should be the 
same, but rather, that the reasons for determination are given to the religious objectors through the same 
procedure. If not, the government should give reasons for the disparate treatment by meeting strict 
scrutiny. However, the Commission in Masterpiece failed to show a principled rationale for discretion to 
determine what should be included within the right of vendors.  
This conclusion can be explained by examples. Suppose the baker was ordered to create a cake with a 
religious message or with a color or a symbol for supporting a specific sexual orientation. It the baker 
refuses to provide the cake in both cases, this behavior would constitute a violation of the public 
accommodation law. However, when the baker thinks the ordered message for the cake is offensive so 
that he cannot create the cake for any customers, he can refuse to provide it. Even if the offensiveness 
which the baker has is unreasonable, the refusal should be allowed.  
However, it would be difficult for the vendor to refuse to create the goods because the products would be 
used for same-sex marriage or certain religious events, and this fact hurts the vendors. If asked to decorate 
a cake of the same shape and color as the same cake offered at a heterosexual marriage or another event, 
the refusal would be assessed as discriminatory conduct, because it would be beyond the right of vendors.  
One might consider that the free exercise claim could overlap the free speech claim. Furthermore, the 
free exercise claims may cause the same results with the free speech claims because the free exercise is 
deeply related to the religious message. However, there is one difference between the speech claim and 
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the free exercise claim. When the free speech clause protects the expressive conduct, it requires subjective 
and objective elements for communicability, while the free exercise claim needs what is subjectively 
offensive. In the former case, aggressive messages that the user does not allow should be recognized by 
reasonable people as messages, but in the latter, subjective aggression may be recognized. 
Religious believers are ready to continue to violate the law or to give up their jobs if the law forces them 
to act in a way they consider to be forbidden, based on their convictions if those small parts of religious 
exemptions would be not carved out. LGBTQ supporters insist that anti-discrimination culture should be 
settled in society even by accepting legal enforcement and abandoning persuasion toward religious 
believers.325 Such disagreement is contributing to deepening social conflicts. What the court should do at 
this point is not to grant exemption privileges to the forbidden area, or to limit the free exercise in public 
accommodations, but to inform vendors what the scope of the allowance is. Reducing full and equal 
enjoyment to eradicating discrimination places a limit on the conduct of vendors. However, when the 
courts determine whether the refusal of a vendor is permissible in the light of the right of vendors to 
choose what to sell and the duty of vendors to provide equal access to their customers, it allows vendors 
to enjoy freedom and to embrace the responsibility in public accommodations. And Masterpiece can be 
consistent with the Sherbert test, which the Smith Court read as a procedural-equal treatment.    
 
In sum, as to the free exercise argument, this thesis insists that it is a permissible rejection within the 
scope of the vendor's product options because it does not violate the full and equal enjoyment, which 
could be interpreted as the customer's equal access to goods and services based on the right of vendors to 
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choose what to sell, as Justice Kagan stated. Furthermore, it argues that procedural-equal treatment should 
be given equal access to the vendors, including the vendors who decline to provide their goods and 
services due to religious and secular reasons. The differences between discriminatory declination and 
permissible rejection rely on whether the vendor could supply his goods or services to all other customers; 
in other words, the refusal is within the right of vendors to choose what to sell. Here, the official or 
government agency could have the discretion to determine whether the vendor’s refusal could be a 
discriminatory or conscientious declination. If the official or government agency did not give the vendor 
opportunities to consider the reasons for refusals in a principled rationale, it could constitute a substantial 
burden on religious believers by deprivation. And then, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece should 







   V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The Masterpiece Court faced solving the conflict between eradicating discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and assuring freedom of religion and expression. However, the Court did not answer this issue 
but gave the vendor a ‘pyrrhic victory.’ It brought severe disputes to the forefront of society again.   
Therefore, this thesis aimed at examining the validity of free speech claim for religious exemptions on 
the one hand, and reviewing the Court's position on the current complex entanglement of religious 
exemption theories on the other hand, and finally, it gave a possible suggestion to coexist between two 
constitutional values without an all-or-nothing solution.   
As to the free speech argument, a compelled speech argument should succeed if, and only if, the 
vendor’s good or service is expressive according to the meaning of the Free Speech Clause. In the case of 
a baker, the Court would protect making a cake bearing messages through images or texts as a symbolic 
expression, but it would not protect making a generic, artisticallydecorative cake as either a pure or 
symbolic expression. As a result, a baker’s compelled speech argument should prevail in the first 
situation, when the cake includes messages through images or texts. In other words, the public 
accommodations law could not be used to require a baker to make a cake with which he disagrees. 
However, this should not prevail on a compelled speech theory in Masterpiece itself.326   
There is an attempt to limit free speech arguments claimed by vendors in a commercial context to view 
them as unprotected speech. However, this endeavor would be difficult to fulfill. Free speech claims may 
be ruled out by the balancing test since this is not an absolute right. Furthermore, for those who claim 
religious freedom, it would be more appropriate to seek a new interpretation of the free exercise clause 
rather than to urge free speech claims that can only be partially protected.327 
 
326 Chapter II. 1 and 2.  





 The Court adhered to the Smith rule except when the government explicitly triggered animus toward 
religion. However, the Smith Court did not explicitly abandon the Sherbert test. Instead, the Court 
changed its meaning through another interpretation in dicta.  The original Sherbert test before Smith 
protected religious freedom by reflecting religious susceptibility when the courts determined whether the 
government imposed a substantial burden on religious practices, while the modified Sherbert test read by 
Smith protected religious practices by ensuring the opportunity to use an individualized assessment 
system. This means the Court’s position toward religious freedom transitioned from substantive equality 
to procedural equality, equality of opportunities. Furthermore, several decisions by the lower courts have 
developed this transformed test into a categorical exemption that ensures the same outcomes as secular 
reasons.328 
As to the free exercise argument, this thesis insists that it is a permissible rejection within the scope of 
the vendor's product options because it does not violate the full and equal enjoyment, which , as stated by 
Justice Kagan, could be interpreted as the customer's equal access to goods and services based on the 
right of vendors to choose what to sell. Furthermore, it argues that procedural-equal treatment should be 
given equal access to the vendors, including the vendors who decline to provide their goods and services 
due to religious and secular reasons when within permissible refusal. The differences between 
discriminatory declination and permissible rejection rely on whether the vendor could supply his goods or 
services to all other customers; in other words, the refusal is within the right of vendors to choose what to 
sell. Here, the official or government agency could have the discretion to determine whether the vendor’s 
refusal could be a discriminatory or conscientious declination. If they did not give the vendor 
opportunities to consider the reasons for refusals in a principled rationale, it could constitute a substantial 
burden on religious believers by deprivation. And then, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece should 
be understood to require procedural-equal treatment, applicable to religious and secular vendors alike.329  
 
328 Chapter III.  





Religious people are concerned that they are being treated unequally by society and their convictions 
ignored without justification. If civility means anything, it is to provide justification for when citizens are 
treated differently.330  
  
 
330 Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 261, at 164-66; Leah Litman, Dignity and Civility, Reconsidered, 70 
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